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COMMENT
Do Survival Values Form a Sufficient Basis for an
Objective Morality?': A Realist's2 Appraisal of the
Rules of Human Conduct
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Question Presented in its General Form
Can we say that the species called homa sapiens sapiens ought
to survive? Every day, year in and year out, we follow all sorts of
rules. What does surviving have to do with these rules?
1 This essay advances portions of a theory about human behavior in the context of
the physical world. It does not provide a theory about life as a whole. Survival, which
appears to be a condition of physical life, seems worthy of its own discussion. Such a
discussion may help clarify the relationship between surviving and living. In the end, the
discussion points to questions both practical and metaphysical.
A particular reference point for the general theme is H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT
OF LAW 181, 181-95 (Chapter IX on law and morals). Of equal importance are Regina v.
Dudley, 14 Q.B. 273 (1884), reprinted in SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER,
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 114-19 (5th ed. 1989) and L.L. Fuller, "The Case of the
Speluncean Explorers," 62 HARV. L. REv. 616 (1949). The catalyst for an essay on objective
values comes from a jurisprudence course taught by Professor G. Robert Blakey at the
Notre Dame Law School. Additional insights on objective values come from a course on
moral theory and the U.S. Constitution taught jointly by Professor Gerard V. Bradley of
the Law School and Professor Sotirios Barber of the Government Department.
2 A realist, for the purposes of this essay, is one who analyzes factual situations in
order to formulate statements about facts and about relationships between facts through
inferences. Such statements are not the principal reality but are at most reflections of
that reality captured by the imagination and expressed in words and concepts available to
the particular realist. Other formulations and other approaches may reflect different as-
pects of the same reality or reflect the same aspects of the same reality in different ways.
The position I take is that some of our reflections are accurate enough to draw
reasonable conclusions about the consequences of the true state of affairs in light of an
objective. A person who endeavors to drive a car safely is such a realist. Can such a
realist, as a realist, say or perceive anything about the moral conditions of driving a car?
See generally DAVID 0. BRINK, MORAL REALISM AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS (1989);
JOHN C. ECCuES, EVOLUTION OF THE BRAIN (1989); WILmw JAMES, PRAGMATISM (1907);
Imre Lakatos, Falsfication and the 'Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, in CRITCISM
AND THE GROWrH OF KNOWLEDGE 91 (Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave eds.. 1970); KARL
H. PRIBRAM, BRAIN AND PERCEPTION (1991); THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC THEORIES
(Frederick Suppe ed., 2d ed. i977); GRAHAM WALKER, MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTrrU-
TIONAL THOUGHT (1990); Michael Moore, Moral Reali, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 1061.
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B. Observations and Conclusions
We live in a physical world. We hold metaphysical thoughts
and religious convictions in our heads. We rely on information
and theories, both physical and metaphysical, to make decisions.
From this pool of information and theories, we develop or receive
systems of morality.' We use this pool of information and these
theories to develop other theories which we then use to interpret
events or give meaning to our lives.4
We face a physical problem. In order for our theories to have
any impact on either ourselves or the physical world around us,
we have to survive.5 By surviving I mean that we continue to live
our lives into the next day and the groups with which we are
associated continue to bear offspring who successively continue to
survive in the future. By observing the physical world around us,
we discover that in order to survive, we have to meet some mini-
mum set of rules which we did not develop. We devise rules which
are tested against that minimum. We discover that there are differ-
3 By system of morality I mean a system of rules and values which describe correct
behavior relative to a principle or objective grounded in a source. Fulfillment of the
rules or actualization of the values satisfies the principle or achieves the objective. For
the system to apply to an actor, the actor must have the ability to conform or not con-
form through some vehicle of cognizant choice.
4 To the degree that our outlook is shaped by the ideas which we absorb, which
for whatever internal reason we find relevant, and which we attempt to reconcile, elimi-
nate or live with, to that degree the following sources stand out in my mind as influenc-
es on my thought relative to the subject of this essay: THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Mi-
chael Oakeshott ed., Collier Books 1962) (1651); JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL
CONTRACT (Willmoore Kendall trans., Gateway Editions 1954) (1762); JOHN LOCKE, TWO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Thomas I. Cook ed., Hafner Press 1947) (based on Locke's
6th ed. 1764) (1690); JOHN RAWLS. A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); JOHN E. PFEIFFER, THE
EMERGENCE OF SOCIETY (1977): EDWARD 0. WILSON. ON HUMAN NATURE (1978) (a dis
course in socio-biology); JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (Pe-
ter H. Nidditch ed.. Oxford University Press 1975) (based on Locke's 4th ed. 1700)
(1690); DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE (P.H. Nidditch ed., 2d ed. 1978)
(1740); THE NATURE OF HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS (Robert E. Ornstein ed., 1968) (essays in
psychology and perception); THE MIND'S I (arranged by Douglas R. Hofstadter & Daniel
C. Dennett, 1981) (essays on self and soul); ALBERT EINSTEIN, RELATIVnIY, THE SPECIAL
AND GENERAL THEORY (Robert W. Lawson trans., 1961) (1916); RICHARD P. FEYNMAN ET
AL., THE FEYNMAN LECTURES ON PHYSICS (1963); MAx PLANCK. WHERE IS SCIENCE GOING?
(1932); GARY ZUKAV, THE DANCING WU LI MASTERS, AN OVERVIEW OF THE NEW PHYSICS
(1979); BOB DYLAN, The Times They are A-Changin" on THE TIMES THEY ARE A-CHANGIN'
(Columbia Records 1964), lyrics reprinted in BOB DYLAN. WRITINGS AND DRAWINGS 85
(1973); Genesis 1-4; Ecclesiastes, Romans 7; Micah 6:8.
5 The only exception I can see to this is if we decide not to survive.
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ent combinations of rules which we have devised in the past,6
there are rules which we are currently following,7 and there are
rules which we may yet take to their logical end,8 which do not
meet this minimum. A principal purpose of this essay is to explore.
what impact the minimum set of survival rules has already had,
and necessarily will have, on the rules of conduct devised by hu-
mans. The impact may be more far-reaching than we have allowed
for in the past.9
We face a general set of physical conditions. By observing the
physical world around us, we discover that living organisms, includ-
ing humans, are powered or directed in some way by physical
forces which are generated internally. What is the nature and
source of these internal forces? What significance should this have
for how we view ourselves? We observe that living organisms do
not require free will to survive. Yet they follow rules. Absent free
will, they follow rules encrypted in instinct and trained responses.
The process appears to be physical. The question is, where do
those rules come from, what function do they serve, and what
relationship does the internal rulemaking process of instinct and
trained responses have to humans?" Humans possess rationality,
consciousness, the ability to undertake moral evaluation, the ability
to have religious experiences, and free will. These processes, or
higher brain functions, appear to have enhanced the ability of
humans to survive relative to other species. A second purpose of this
essay is to explore the survival functions of these higher brain
processes, their relationship to instinct and trained responses and
their relationship to the rules humans choose to devise or adopt."
6 Nazi Germany is an example of rules that did not work.
7 Gunfire appears to be the second leading cause of death for Americans ten to
thirty-four years of age. M. Joycelyn Elders, M.D., Surgeon General, Prepared Statement
Before Subcommitte on the Constitution. Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, reprint-
ed in FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, March 23. 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current
File.
8 Depleting the ozone layer is an example of a rule which will probably not work.
Will we set in motion something we can't fix? See, e.g., Malcolm W. Browne, Doubts Ease
on Protecting Ozon N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 11, 1994, at C5 (scientists say doubts about the
ozone-friendliness of hydrofluorocarbons, as substitutes for ozone-destroying
chlorofluorocarbon refrigerants, are probably groundless); Edward 0. Wilson, Is Humanity
Suicidal?, N.Y. TIMEs, May 30, 1993, § 6, at 24 (discussing effects of ozone depletion).
9 Compare HART, supra note 1, at 187-88.
10 See generally PRIBRAM, supra note. 2, at 200-01 (instinctual patterns have common
genetic components); WOLF AND MAN, EVOLTrrION IN PARALLEL 81, 81-106 (Roberta L.
Hall & Henry S. Sharp eds., 1978); ECCLES. supra note 2, at 140-71.
11 See generally JOHN C. ECCLEs, FACING REALIrY 118, 118-73 (1970) (discussing possi-
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We face two particular types of physical conditions. Individually
we tend to identify with one or more small groups, such as our
family, clan, ethnic group, neighborhood or our work environ-
.ment. We are also part of larger systems of humans, such as cities
and nations. As typically perceived by humans, the survival inter-
ests of different groups, both large and small, are likely to clash.
If human groups pursue every instinct they have related to surviv-
al, then physical conflict would be inevitable. Aggression is one of
our instincts. While the conditional statement may be accurate,
the implication in the sentence above it, that the survival interests
of human groups are in conflict, may be in error. A third purpose
of this essay is to explore what the physical rules of survival tell us
about interactions between human groups.1
2
A fourth and general purpose of the essay is to encourage read-
ers to consider or reconsider the nature of the connection be-
tween our survival processes and our systems of morality. Instincts,
trained responses, moral evaluation and rational analysis all pro-
vide suggested solutions to the daily problem of human survival.
These are processes which go on inside of our heads, and have
been going on inside 6ur heads for a long time. The essay is
designed to take a rational, albeit speculative, look at these pro-
cesses of the brain. Our physical histories trace back through our
biochemical histories to the fundamental forces which regulate the
universe. Whatever we may be subjectively-objectively we are all
constructed of the same fundamental material. We are a direct ex-
pression of the underlying energy of the universe. It makes sense
to know more about how we operate, as we try to figure out how
we ought to operate. Our biological and physical history may pro-
vide more guidance than we are accustomed to think. I suggest it
provides the basis for an objective morality. 3
bility of free will); JOHN C. ECCLES, supra note 2, at 217, 217-38; PRIBRAM, supra note 2.
at 199-268; PLANCK, supra note 4, at 107-69 (discussing free will); ARTURO ROSENBLUETH.
MIND AND BRAIN 101, 110-13 (1970); THE BIOLOGY OF THE BRAIN, FROM NEURONS TO
NETORKS (Rodolfo R. Llinas ed., 1988); PER E. ROLAND, BRAIN ACTIvATION (1993).
12 There are two circumstances: (1) each group in the system desires to survive, and
(2) one group desires to survive while the others do not. Outcomes would appear to -de-
pend on whether conquest or mutual assistance becomes the more effective strategy for
surviving. Where one group desires not to survive, defense is necessary. Analysis of what
motivates humans is needed and game theory among free willed humans may apply. See
generally JOHN C. HARSANYI & REINHARD SELTON, A GENERAL THEORY OF EQUILBRIUM SE-
LECTION IN GAMES (1988); JAMES P. KAHAN & AMNON RAPOPORT, THEORIES OF COALITION
FORMATION (1984); ERIC M. LEIFER. ACTORS AS OBSERVERS: A THEORY OF SKILL IN SOCIAL
RELATIONSHIPS (1991); THOMAS C. SCHELLING. THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960).
13 Perhaps H.L.A. Hart underestimated the consequences of our biological history
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Several of the principal conclusions of the essay are:
(1) The human brain in large part functions physically. We
need more facts as to its physical decisionmaking routines to de-
termine whether those routines are in some measure predictable
(e.g., through thermodynamics and quantum mechanics) or inde-
terminate (e.g., through free will). (2) The higher functions of
the brain are potential enhancements to our prospects of survival.
If humans lead themselves to extinction, then the higher functions
of the brain are not enhancements to our prospects of survival.
(3) One of the functions of our moral and rational faculties
has been to verbalize the physical rules of survival which became,
and which become, encoded into the brain through instinct and
trained responses. (4) Another function of our moral and rational
faculties has been to improve or attempt to improve on these
internally encoded rules through the brain's continual observations
and encounters with the physical world.
(5) The physical rules of survival provide a rational basis for
an objective morality which acts as a constraint, or as a neutral
filter, on our subjective systems of morality. (6) Rational analysis
of the consequences of violent group interactions supports a con-
clusion that violent interaction is no longer an effective survival
strategy. If so, then the physical rules of survival support that type
of behavior which would lead, in an environment of cultural diver-
sity, individual awareness, and distributed power, to nonviolent
coexistence. (7) But in order to survive, we have to decide to sur-
vive. Free willed humans are faced with a categorical question of
whether to affirm or not to affirm life.
(8) Whether humans ought to survive may yield to rational
analysis based on physical observations. Survival as an expression
of energy is perhaps selfjustifying. In addition, if a present value
may exist which justifies life, whether or not perceived, then hu-
mans ought to survive to preserve the opportunity for discovering
what that value may be.
when he said: "[W]e may hold it to be a mere contingent fact which could be otherwise, that
in general men do desire to live .... ." HART, supra note 1, at 187-88 (emphasis added).
Perhaps it could be otherwise, but if such an event occurred, then humans would soon
no longer be life forms. Such an event would require overturning all of the rules which
describe how energy functions within life forms. Hart recognizes, however, that "[w]e are
committed to [survival] as something presupposed by the terms of the discussion; for our
concern is with social arrangements for continued existence, not with those of a suicide
club." Id. (emphasis added). In this essay I attempt to look at survival forces without
presupposing anything about them.
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C. The Specifc Issue and the General Question
If humans ought to survive, then the specific issue becomes:
do observations of the physical world reveal to us meaningful rules
of conduct-first, as to what the structure of the physical world is,
and second, as to how humans ought to behave in light of that
structure?
The physical world, for the purposes of this essay, is taken to
include the entirety of the material universe and the physical pro-
cesses which control it, whether known, unknown, or unknowable,
and whether logically consistent or inconsistent. The physical
world includes all inanimate objects and all life forms. By "reveal
to us meaningful rules of conduct" I mean that such rules must
describe processes which are intrinsic to the nature of the physical
world, observable by humans, relevant to human conduct, and not
mere products of human imagination.
In developing a theory of objective morality, I will examine
the relationship between "objective values" and "moral worth."
Examining this relationship will take us back to the overall ques-
tion of whether humans ought to survive.
D. Structure of the Essay
In Part II, I establish the contextual basis for my analysis and
consider the nature of an is/ought relationship.
In Part III, I make observations about the workings of the
physical world. These observations raise questions and shed light
on what life is.
,In Part IV, I develop a theory of objective morality based on
survival. In the process, I develop definitions of objectivity and
subjectivity and examine the operation of free will with respect to
rules of physical and human conduct. I conclude that the higher
functions of the brain are potential enhancements to our pros-
pects of survival and that some moral statements are reflections of
the physical rules of survival.
In Part V, I develop a theory of objective values. In the pro-
cess I establish a framework of particular factors which support
survival. The factors remain constant while the values we assign to
those factors may vary. The common ground for group interaction
is the mutual desire to survive and the constancy of the factors for
survival which are neutral to subjective moralities, i.e., cultural
distinctions.
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In Part VI, I consider the question of whether humans ought
to survive. A religious or metaphysical answer may be required to
answer the question. I close the essay with a thought experiment
on the future impact of the developing field of genetic engineer-
ing. This thought experiment is intended to leave the reader with
additional questions as to what life is.
II. THE CONTEXTUAL SETTING
A. Beginning With Three Thought Experiments
Experiment #1. Imagine you are the commander of a nuclear
submarine submerged near the polar icecap. The area is filled
with icebergs which form narrow, dangerous channels. Dr. Maybe,
a madman commanding a second submarine, has chased you into
one of these channels. His last torpedo blast sealed the channel
behind you, separating you from him. You have ten to fifteen
minutes of oxygen left. Sonar readings indicate two ways out. The
readings indicate that the channel to the left is exactly as wide as
the submarine, but that channel leads to safety. The sonar equip-
ment has a margin of error of 3%. If you attempt the passage and
do not make it through, you will not have time to back out before
Dr. Maybe enters the other channel and seals your fate. Sonar
indicates that the other channel is twice as wide as the submarine,
but it leads back towards the second submarine. If you take that
channel, you may not have time to exit and come around before
Maybe takes an easy shot at your broadsides. You have at most
twenty seconds to make a decision. Any longer and Dr. Maybe will
be in position to seal the right channel with a second torpedo
blast.
What do you decide?
Experiment #2. Imagine you are a prehistoric human. Your clan
has been devastated in a recent fight with a new alien clan over
hunting grounds. It is winter, and as far as you know, you are the
only one left. Food supply is very limited. You are hungry and
getting hungrier. In your hand is a sharpened stick. From your
vantage point you can see the hindquarters of a wild boar hanging
from a tree. It is loosely guarded by one of the youths of the
alien clan. There is enough meat there to sustain you for the few
days it would take to climb over the small mountain to the next
valley. Stories around the campfire say that the next valley is lush
with food and unoccupied by humans. In your own clan, the
Chief of the Tribe had the power to take food from one family
1994]
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unit and give it to another. If you were caught taking food from
another family unit without the Chief's blessing, you would be
severely beaten. If you were caught twice, you would be banished.
Outsiders captured by your clan were first beaten and then en-
slaved. Survivors who accepted their fate were eventually accepted
into the tribe, but the strongest males were usually tortured to
death. You do not know the ways of this clan.
What do you decide?
Experiment #3. Imagine you are a lumberjack in the Amazon
rain forests. You've been offered a job cutting trees by the acre.
You and your family need the work. You are aware of the claims
that the world's ecological system could be irreversibly affected by
the wholesale destruction of this oxygen producing forest and that
hundreds of species of plants and insects, and thousands of sub-
species, are being extinguished as the acres of rainforest disap-
pear. You are also aware that claims as to the nature and degree
of ecological damage are not yet proven, you know that someone
else will take the job, and you are not sure of what is really meant
by hundreds of species or thousands of subspecies.
What do you decide?
Would it make any difference if you were an office worker in
a different country offered a job with a furniture manufacturer
who annually buys a small part of the cut crop?
B. The Analytical Context
The purpose of this essay is to explore the relationship be-
tween physical rules of survival and the rules of human conduct.
The first three thought experiments are intended to highlight
some of the issues. Prior to writing, I began with two principal
observations, that (i) humans hold a variety of views as to what
constitutes correct behavior, and (ii) humans live in a physical
world which runs according to physical rules. I would like to know
what these two factual observations have to do with each other.
What I see is a potential physical connection between survival
and our notions of morality. Free will lies somewhere along the
line of that connection. What I am looking for' are the forces, if
any, acting on humans which determine or influence the rules we
adopt, and the limits, if any, on the kinds of moralities we ought
to adopt if we are to physically survive.
When I examine rules of human conduct, I discover that such
rules describe acts of human will. Examples of such rules include
social norms, legislative acts, common law rules, and personal rules
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of conduct. I can describe these rules as acts of will intended to
be applied to other acts of will to achieve an objective. We con-
nect this process with our notion of values. We describe these
values by various names, such as customs, principles, policies, and
moral worth. Values and "objectives" appear to be relative and
subjective. They appear to be things which are in our heads.
When I examine rules of physical conduct, I discover that
such rules describe physical forces, such as- the force of gravity. We
don't usually connect physical rules with our notion of values or
with acts of will. We do not usually say that a physical force has
an objective. Instead we say that physical forces apply to objects,
and we connect the rules with their objective effects or physical
consequences. Physical forces appear to be things which are out-
side our heads.
I can summarize these two relations as follows, and then ask if
there is a connection between them. If there is a connection, then
physical forces may shape human rules:
(1) human rules <=> values/objectives
I?
(2) physical rules <==> effects/consequences
Figure 1
With life forms other than humans, the connection seems
straightforward. The squirrel buries an acorn for the winter. Bury-
ing acorns can be described as a rule which offsets the physical
effects of winter and hunger, relative to squirrels. Survival appears
to be an objective 4 and acorns appear to be a value in support
of that objective. The value of an acorn will change if some other
food supply enters the picture, or the objective changes. Not every
animal buries acorns.
14 "Objective" in this context means outcome or consequence of the process. See
definition of "objective 'end" infra Part IV.B. Free-willed humans may consciously pursue
objectives or unconsciously achieve objective ends. Non-free-willed organisms may be able
to pursue the objects of their desire, such as food, but it is unlikely they can conceptual-
ize a concept such as survival. Survival becomes a consequence, of their actions.
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A sequence of events can be seen. Physical events occur. Liv-
ing organisms encounter these events. They respond in some way.
They do not all respond in the same way. Physical conditions de-
termine which responses work. Over time, organisms develop inter-
nal rules in response to physical events which, if followed, produce
actions which support survival. From this sequence, two physical
conditions relative to squirrels, winter and hunger, appear to influ-
ence rules of conduct and their associated values in light of an
objective. It appears that these rules and values become encoded
in the squirrel's brain.
I observe that the process can work in the other direction.
Desires produce conduct in accordance with rules which are inter-
nal to the brain. The conduct produces consequences in the phys-
ical world in accordance with physical rules which are external to
the brain. The beaver builds a dam which floods the meadow.
Several objectives relative to the beaver are achieved in the pro-
cess: underwater passages across what used to be a meadow, a
nesting site for raising the young, and a fortress against predators.
An underlying objective appears to be survival.
I observe that the squirrel's process and the beaver's process
are linear with respect to time. One event follows another. They
are also cyclical. Steps in the process occur repetitiously. The lin-
ear aspect gives the impression that time and events are going
someplace. The cyclical aspect gives the impression they are going
no place at all. I make this point to counteract the idea that there
is necessarily a subjective purpose to the process of survival. The
landscape is changing, but if there is any purpose in it, it has to
be demonstrated. 5 The process may work like a repetitious chem-
ical reaction.
If I ignore for the moment the higher brain functions of
humans, this simple animal-like connection between the two rela-
15 Metaphysical or religious theories may identify a subjective purpose. The entire
physical system may also be programmed toward an end or a general set of conditions,
even if there is no subjective purpose involved. See generally RENATO DULBECCO, THE DE-
SIGN OF LIFE (1987); ERNST MAYR, TOWARD A NEw PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY (1988). If life
functions like a game of chance, such as repetitiously throwing a pair of dice. there may
be a statistically determined pattern which necessarily results even though individual events
cannot be determined. See generally F. DAVID PEAT, EINSTEIN'S MOON, BELL'S THEOREM
AND THE CURIOUS QUEST FOR QUANTUM REALI'IY 54-58 (1990) (describing statistically
determined pattern of light interference); JIM BAGGOTT, THE MEANING OF QUANTUM THE-
ORY 29-30 (1992); NICK HERBERT, QUANTUM REALTY 95-97 (1985). To what degree there
may be a connection between quantum mechanics, events in the brain, and evolution is
undetermined.
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tions in Figure 1 appears to apply equally to humans. We store
food and we build shelters in response to physical events. We act
aggressively and we nurture our young. We have presumably been
doing these things since before the time we developed or received
free will.






events, => perceptions => meaning => response => events2
Figure 2
As with squirrels, rules and values tend to be shaped by the events
we experience. The operation of this linear cycle is reactive. It's
like heading for the exit when the fire starts. In such a circum-
stance survival would appear to be. the objective. A door would be
valuable. The objectives come from somewhere. We need to know
more about the sources for the objectives.
Another way of looking at the same linear cycle is to change
the order by starting with the meaning of events instead of the
events themselves:
meaning, => response => events => perceptions => meaning 2
Figure 3
Figure 3 requires imagining the five base steps in Figure 2 as
a circle, then breaking the circle at a different point and laying it
16 Drawings such as these are conceptual devices only. They do not represent a
specific scientific theory. "
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out linearly in time. If I replace the two italicized words, response
and perceptions, with two other words, action and reflection, and add





meaning1 => action => events => reflection => meaning2
Figure 4
The operation of the linear cycle is now proactive. It starts
with a desire in light of an objective. The desire triggers an action
in accordance with a rule. Some view of events is presupposed. It's
like a wolf pack starting to hunt, or a submarine commander who
sends out a sonar signal. The results come back to us in the reac-
tive mode. If the answers we get are not what we expect, the phys-
ical encoding of rules and values which are in our heads may
change. We need to know more about where desires come from
and what type of force they generate within the brain.
The proactive mode has an advantage over the reactive mode
relative to survival. It offers an animal the opportunity to initiate
actions and experiments, rather than leaving the animal depen-
dent on the chance flow of events to which to react. Animals with
legs can go looking for food. The experimental aspect, however,
without some way of directing it, is still dependent on-the animal
chancing onto an experiment. Random unplanned trial and error
is a slow process. An animal without the higher brain functions of
a human may not even notice the reaction of events to an un-
planned experiment.
If I now add one or more internal subroutines (X) to the
brain which are not directly dependent on'external events, but
which are indirectly related to them through a process of interpre-
tation and decisionmaking, then meanings, rules and values may
change internally before the brain commits to an action. Depend-
ing on how versatile the subroutines are, objectives of the brain
may be able to be changed as well. If humans become aware of
what is happening, then reaction of events to random experiments
are more likely to be noticed. Experiments might begin to take
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place more frequently, and become planned and directed. Conse-
quences to oneself will be recognized and self-conscious objectives
can be adopted. If meaning, rules, values and objectives change,
modifications in the actions which would have occurred are likely
to take place. The process of changing actions has advantages




-=> events ==> meaning ==> action ==> events ==>
Figure 5
Let X in Figure 5 stand for the higher brain functions of a
human. How freely meanings, rules, values, objectives and actions
can change depends on how free X is from the physical sequence.
of both external and internal physical events. Animals without the
higher brain functions of humans appear to be generally limited
to their instinctual and trained responses.
17
An example of the transforming effect of X in humans and
the degree of our disconnection from real events is found in our
ability to contemplate and act on hypothetical events rather than
real ones. I can picture a new building or imagine a purple cow. I
can make decisions based on hypothetical situations, such as our
three thought experiments. These decisions might change an ac-
tion which would otherwise have occurred.
If I can contemplate an existing value or objective which is
physically encoded in my brain, I can change it or override it
through an act of will.'" The degree of difficulty I have at times
in doing this shows how physically powerful the rules and values
which become encoded in my brain can be. Even if I fail to
change existing values or objectives, I can alter outcomes by add-
17 See infra note 73.
18 Memory, instincts and trained responses are examples of such encoding. See gen-
erally ECCLES, sup'a note 2; PRIBRAM, supra note 2.
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ing new objectives and values to the system.' Improvements in
the system relative to survival can theoretically be made or objec-
tives unrelated to survival can be established. Conflicts of various
kinds can be created or resolved. Whether or not conflicts occur,
balancing between values may be required in order to make a
decision relative to an objective.
How X works determines how values and objectives change.
How X works determines which future among many humans will
actualize. The subroutines of X, as drawn in Figure 5, are not en-
tirely disassociated from real events. Real events occur on both
ends of the process. If the subroutines of X and the connections
involved are all physical, then what we know or think we know
becomes a physical factor, along with external events, in how values
get changed. Ideas become objects and may exert forces of their
own. The process may be predictable, if not predetermined.2 1 If
we have free will, then by definition we can change values and
decisions in an unpredictable way. The process may be indetermi-
nate.
Since humans have to deal with both external and internal
events, and since our assortment of objectives and values affects
the actions we take to deal with them, it would be useful to know
more about how X works. It would be useful to know what influ-
ences us to change our values and objectives. It would be useful
to know what the physical processes are involved.
This brings me back to my original two relations in Figure 1.
What influence do physical forces and their physical consequences
have on the rules of human conduct and their associated values
and objectives? What function(s), in addition to moral contempla-
tion, does X perform? What relationship do these other functions
have to moral contemplation? In contemplating this problem, I
observe that I have two connections to the physical world to ex-
plore. My higher brain functions are connected to the physical
world through the physical sensations I receive and to which I
19 I do not imply that contemplation is the only means by which new objectives and
values enter the system. Insights and inspirations may enter the brain through contempla-
tion or in some other way. See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS. NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 59-
73 (1980) (describing how we come to identify basic or self-evident goods). The process
of artistic interpretation may involve their own routines.
20 The throw of a pair of dice is statistically predictable even if an individual result
is not predetermined. The reaction of two billiard balls striking together is predictable
and predetermined.
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respond. My higher brain functions are also connected to the
physical world through the physical history of my biochemistry.
When I ask what my responses to physical sensations as well
as the history of my biochemistry tells me, my desire for feasible
hypotheses prompts me to look for commonalities with other bio-
chemical organisms. Although humans are different from other
organisms, they are also similar in a number of ways. If I tempo-
-arily suspend my notions of moral worth and my notions of will-
ful purpose, and ask what life forms do in common, the reflection
I get back from the physical world is that life forms survive. It is
not all that they do, but they all do that. The survival process, ab-
sent free will, appears to be filly describable by a set of physical
rules and physical forces. The actions I see life forms take appear
to be fully accounted for by the manner in which their biochemis-
tries function in response to external and internal events. Perhaps
the subroutines of X developed as an objective end or conse-
quence of biochemical events, supplying a means for enhancing
the prospects of human survival.
If I were to take the physical rules of survival as a subset of
all physical rules, and add in what I do not know about the sub-
routines of X, then my original two relations become:




(2a) survival rules <---> physical consequences
(2b) physical rules <--> physical consequences
Figure 6
A fully detailed sequence of the steps it takes to translate
physical consequences into rules of survival within the biochemistry
of living organisms would look like the steps in a complicated
chemical or "bioelectrical" problem.2' On the other hand, the
21 See, e.g., PRIBRAM, supra note 2, at 132 (displaying a figure of a simplified sche-
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results look a lot like human rules of conduct when we describe
them using ordinary language: "the squirrel buries acorns for the
winter." I observe that this statement about squirrels can easily be
turned into a forward-looking rule warning of consequences by an
organism capable of imagining hypotheticals: "the squirrel ought to
bury acorns for the winter."
Assume for the moment that physical processes are objective
and not subjective. If our thought processes are physically driven,
then the process of translating or transforming a present factual
statement into a future oriented "ought' statement may be
physical.2 This raises the question of what the physical rules of
survival have to do objectively with shaping the rules of human
conduct. Modern systems of morality, on the other hand, seem to
focus on questions related to justifications. Is it morally justified to
store food? Is it morally justified to store food which is currently
in the possession of someone else? Since storing food supports
survival, this would seem to necessarily raise the question of
whether it is morally justified for life forms to survive. Or, with re-
spect to our species, can it be said that humans ought to survive?
As a moral issue, this question appears to be subjective and
evaluative. If the question is treated not as a moral issue, but as a
question related to the probabilities that humans will survive, then
the question becomes objective. What does the objective have to
do with the subjective?
The answer to the last question appears to lie in the opera-
tion of the subroutines of X. How connected or disconnected is
free will from the physical world?2" Do the moral conditions we
tend to attach to human behavior reflect any facts about the phys-
ical world or do they represent only the attitudes which develop in
our minds? Are any of our moral rules derived from physical
rules? At its base, this essay is an effort to identify the objective
and subjective elements involved in the formation and handling of
matic of hypothetical memory trace circuit for discrete behaviorial responses learned as
adaptations to aversive events). See generally THE SYNAPTIC ORGANIZATION OF THE BRAIN
(Gordon M. Shepherd ed., 1990); HARUN K.M. YUSUF, UNDERSTANDING THE BRAIN AND
ITS DEVELOPMENT. A CHEMICAL APPROACH (1992).
22 See generally PRIBRAM, supra note 2. at xxii-xxix (describing theory of constructhist
transformations of perceptions in the context of realism).
23 A primary source of connectedness is energy. All physical matter can be reduced
to various combinations of materialized energy. See generally FEYNMAN, supra note 4. We
will be discussing in this essay how some of these material manifestations of energy relate
to each other.
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rules of human conduct, and to relate those elements to the pro-
cess of human survival.
C. The Is/Ought Relationship
Since I purport to develop an objective morality, derived from
factual observations, it is appropriate to quote here a passage by
David Hume on the apparent futility of such an undertaking:
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I
have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time
in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of
God, or makes observations concerning affairs; when of a sud-
den I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copula-
tions of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition
that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This
change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last conse-
quence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new
relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd
and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be
given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new
relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely
different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this
precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers;
and am persuaded, that this small attention wou'd subvert all
the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinc-
tion of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations
of objects, nor is perceiv'd by reason.24
In shortened form, the is/ought distinction states that you
cannot derive a statement of how things ought to be from descrip-
tions of how things are.' How things ought to be are matters of
24 HUME. supra note 4, at 469-70.
25 A number of efforts have been made to defend, overcome, discredit, circumvent,
avoid or explain the is/ought distinction, also referred to as the naturalistic fallacy or
fact/value disparity. See generally THE IS-OUGHT QUESTION (W.D. Hudson ed., 1969);
BRINK, supra note 2, at 144-70, FINNIS, supra note 19, at 33-42; RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990), HILARY PUTNAM, REALISM AND REASON 229, 229-47
(1983) (why realism can't be naturalized); STEPHEN TOULMIN. THE PLACE OF REASON IN
ETHICS (University of Chicago Press 1986) (1950); WALKER, supra note 2; Arnold Brecht,
The Myth of Is and Ought, 54 HARV. L. REV. 811 (1941); John Finnis, Natural Law and
Legal Reasoning, in NATURAL LAW THEORY 134-157 (Robert P. George ed.. 1992); Stanley
Fish, Almost Pragmatism: Richard Posner's Jurisprudenc 57 U. CHI. L. REv'. 1447 (1990)
(book review); Lon L. Fuller, Human Purpose and Natural Law, 53 J. PHIL 697 (1956),
eprinted in 3 NATURAL LW FORUM 68 (1958); Moore. supra note 2: Ernest Nagel, Fact,
Value, and Human PurposA 4 NATURAL LAW FORUM 26 (1959); Jeremy Waldron, The Irrele-
vance of Moral Objectivity, in NATURAL LAW THEORY 158-87 (Robert P. George ed., 1992);
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preference, matters of subjective will, or matters derived from
sources other than by reasoning from observations of the physical
world. Normative rules cannot logically be deduced or inferred
from descriptive rules or from scientific facts or principles."
I will address the is/ought distinction at various points in this
essay. Under the rules for constructing a deductive syllogism, if
the conclusion of the syllogism is an ought statement, then at
least one of the premises must also be an ought statement. For a
realist,27 the premises and the conclusion must also reflect con-
ditions in the real world if the real life integrity of the syllogism is
to be maintained. This means that it is most important to explore
the nature and source of our premises, and their realistic connec-
tion to a conclusion.
It is here that I think the is/ought distinction may be mis-
leading, although not in and of itself invalid. Generalizing, the dis-
tinction asks, what are the bases for both our conclusions and our
premises, and are these bases valid? The is/ought distinction is
misleading because its scope related to the kinds of inferences
which can rationally be made is more limited than its words sug-
gest, particularly in its shortened form. The distinction needs to
be qualified. 'Some inferences from is to ought may be valid. The
distinction is not in and of itself invalid, because some inferences
from is to ought may not be valid.
An example of a deductive syllogism which follows the rules
for constructing such syllogisms is as follows: All trees are green.
This is a tree. Therefore, this tree is green. Deductive reasoning
takes the general form of a mathematical certainty because it
follows rules which work like mathematics.
If I rationalize the syllogism to physical reality,. however, the
statements of the syllogism change to: All trees were green (the last
time I checked). This is a tree. This tree ought now to be green.
"Ought now" in this context conveys one of our general assump-
tions about the physical world: that the rules which describe the
physical world do not randomly or suddenly change. "Ought now"
also conveys one of our general conclusions about the physical
world: that outcomes of physical processes are in some measure
predictable, even if that measure is statistical probabilities. They
Kenneth I. Winston, Is/Ought Redux: The Pragmatist Context of Lon Fuller's Conception of the
Law, 8 OXFoRD J. LEGAL STUD. 329 (1988).
26 HART, supra note 1. at 182-83.
27 See supra note 1.
[Vol. 69:4
COMMENT-SURVIVAL VALUES AND OBJECTIVE MOIALITY
are predictable because physical processes produce sequential
events which are connected to each other through time. If all
trees were green yesterday, and if nothing changes, this tree ought
to be green today. We rely on these connections to make deduc-
tive inferences about what ought to be the case now.
In theory, if we know what physical process took place, and if
we know all the facts upon which that process acted, then we can
predict outcomes with mathematical certainty or with statistical
certainty. Where we are missing some facts, but know the general
physical rules which can explain the missing facts, then we make
inferences about what ought to be case with respect to those miss-
ing facts. We make these inferences based on our assessment of
the likelihood that certain events took place or that certain pro-
cesses were engaged that explain the results, given the general
rule. Such inferences take the form of intuitive assessments of the
probabilities that are involved in the physical, processes which took
place.
We constantly rely, and of necessity must rely, on such infer-
ences to make decisions, because we often do not know with cer-
tainty what the relationship is between two events." The validity
of such reasoning depends on the accuracy of our perception
about the possible or probable relations between known and un-
known entities or attributes. These possible or probable relations
are described by the probability distributions associated with physi-
cal processes.
Such reasoning routinely combines inductive inferences with
deductive ones. We use inductive reasoning to develop general
rules about physical processes from particular facts.29 If we know
28 This is typical of jury decisions. Juries intuitively assess the probabilities that event
A or event B happened. based on an intuitive grasp of the general rule(s) which apply
to such circumstances.
29 This is typical of scientific hypotheses. We ordinarily attempt to "verify" our induc-
tive inferences about physical possibilities through empirical studies. We develop a general
rule upon which we come to rely. Once given a general physical rule, probability assess-
ments about outcomes are possible based on that general rule. It may be that the gener-
al rule itself (the inductive inference) has no ascertainable probability associated with it.
See Lakatos, supra note 2, at 91-96 (empirical facts do not prove scientific propositions).
Compare John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L. Q. 17 (1924); Moore, supra
note 2, at 1106-16. What I am suggesting is that it is reasonable to rely on such general
rules based on their ability to explain observable consequences, even though the general
rules as we perceive them will change when consequences arise which cannot be ex-
plained. But see PuTNAM, supra note 25. The brain appears to function pragmatically in
light of practical exigencies. That some devised rules do not work and some do, suggests
that there are limiting factors, or constraints, in the physical world relative to an objec-
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something about a shade of red, and something else about a
shade of blue, then we may be able to make an inductive leap to
a general proposition about all shades of red or all shades of blue
or about light or color or whatever else is possibly related to what
we know about red and blue. If we know something about apples
and oranges, we may be able to say something intelligent about
bananas, or about all fruits. Once we have constructed a general
rule (or proposition), we use that rule to deduce ought statements
(probability assessments) about other particular cases." Our in-
ductive inferences may be in error, in which case our deductions
may be in error. Then again, our inductive inferences may be
valid, or at least viable.31
We extend our logical inferences from the past into the fu-
ture. Such future oriented inferences, like past and present ones,
take the form of "ought" statements, as in "the sun ought to rise
tomorrow." If we say, "the sun will rise tomorrow," we have spoken
loosely. We do not really know that to be a fact. But if there are
fixed physical rules for transforming or converting one thing into
another, then a physical relationship exists upon which to base
viable ought statements. That relationship is described by the
probabilities associated with the physical events involved. There is
a high probability that the sun will rise tomorrow.32
Hume questions the jump from is to ought because he claims
the two concepts are "entirely different.""3 If he is right, then
there may be no relationship between is and ought upon which to
base any viable inferences. If he is wrong, then the is/ought dis-
tinction is invalid to the extent of that relationship. 4
Whether the concepts are different or related depends on
what the concepts are. And that depends on what we mean by the
tive.
30 A related means of reasoning is by analogy. Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Rea-
soning, 106 HARV. L. REX,. 741 (1993).
31 The distinction between -validity and viability is that validity goes to the truth of a
proposition, while viability goes to the practical success, or empirical workability, of an
inductive inference. If an inductive inference explains all the known facts which relate to
it, we can at least say it is viable.
32 'We rely here on the same general assumption (continuity of physical rules
through time) and the same general conclusion (fixed physical relationship between
events). Future oriented inductive inferences remain possibilities with a reliance factor. A
person driving a car relies on this reliance factor. Deductive inferences have probabilities
associated with them taking the inductive inference or general rule as a given.
33 HuME, supra note 4. at 469-70.
34 Even if there is a relationship, the human brain still may not be able to perceive
any valid or viable inferences.
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word "is" and by the word "ought." In developing a theory of
objective morality I will address three connotations of the word
"ought," their relationship to each other, and to "is"."
The first connotation relates to probability, as in "the sun
ought to rise tomorrow." The second relates to influencing deci-
sions, as in "Gret ought not steal" or "the trucker ought not drive
under that low bridge." The connotation here is "X ought to
make a decision not to do Y, because. . . " There could be practical
reasons unrelated to morality not to steal or drive under low
bridges. This type of ought statement usually looks to the conse-
quences of some action related to some objective. I will refer to
these as rational* oughts if there are physical probabilities connect-
ing the ought statement to its consequences and therefore its
objective. The third connotation of "ought" relates to our notions
of value in general and moral value in particular. "The squirrel
ought to bury acorns for the winter" is an example of a rational
ought statement and an objective value statement because a buried
acorn has a value relative to survival. "Gret ought not steal be-
cause it is wrong" is potentially an example of a subjective value
statement, depending on what "wrong" means.
I will contend that the second and third connotations (both
versions) of "ought" developed because of the way the human
brain developed. They represent, at least in some cases, direct or
modified transformations of physical oughts which were derived
originally from the physical rules of survival. They reflect the phys-
ical rules of survival. An is/ought relationship potentially exists
relative to each of these connotations. By acts of free will, howev-
er, humans can sever the connection between the rules of human
conduct and the physical rules of survival. Nevertheless, all three
connotations describe functions which potentially serve survival,
even though I will conclude that the process of evaluating things
is relative. Relativity does not equal subjectivity.
It may be that the is/ought distinction as generally used is
intended to apply only to the moral value version of the third
connotation of the word "ought". We associate the word "ought"
35 I observe that if Hume is right, we may not be able to use the word is at all. If
I'm looking at the Statue of Liberty, can I say that Brooklyn is where I thought it wS a
minute ago, or for that matter, is the Statute of Liberty where I think it is? All I can
really say is that these two things ought to be there. We have really only future oughts
merging into past ones. Or, more conventionally, inferences based on the past are used
to project the future.
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with the word "morality." We associate the rules of a morality with
value judgments. We have come to associate value judgments with
subjectivity. Value judgments are suspect under the is/ought dis-
tinction, because we believe there are no valid connections be-
tween subjective values and objective facts. Exploring the connec-
tion between subjective values and objective facts goes to the heart
of my inquiry. 6
III. OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE PHYSICAL WORLD
A. A Theory of Beginnings
According to one theory of the physical world, the universe
began as a point in empty space. There was no physical matter. At
zero hour, that point exploded. Immediately thereupon there was
an enormous outflowing of high octane energy. Within a few sec-
onds free energy began to convert into physical matter. The first
subatomic particles were born. 7
The questions to ask are: what sort of thing is energy, and
what is it's source?
B. The Next Steps
Within a few minutes, subatomic particles and free energy
began to combine to form larger material objects. These larger
material objects eventually formed into a variety of things we call
stars and planets. The behavior of stars and planets is described by
the laws of physics and thermodynamics. In between the first few
minutes and the formation of stars and planets there were inter-
mediate steps. Afterwards, there were subsequent steps.
Both the intermediate and the subsequent steps involved the
formation of atoms followed by the formation of molecules. Matter
is a materialization of energy, as described by Einstein's formula;
36 1 do not deal with a fourth connotation of "ought" which relates to "obligation."
although this may be the most common understanding of the applicability of the
is/ought distinction. I treat our sense of obligation to conform, and our desire to con-
form, to rule X as instinctual or trained responses. As such they are physical rules encod-
ed in our brains which become associated with other authoritative rules. They can sup-
port survival, but they can also become associated with rules which do not support suri-
al. Our sense of obligation and desire to conform have to be assessed like our sense not
to steal has to be assessed.
37 See generally Steven Frautschi, Entropy in an Expanding Universe, in ENTROpy, INFOR-
MATION, AND EVOLUTION (Bruce H. Weber et al. eds., 1988); STEVEN WEINBERG, THE
FIRST THREE MINUTES (1977).
[Vol. 69:4
COMMENT-SURVIVAL VALUES AND OBJECTIVE MORALITY
e-mc (energy equals mass times the speed of light38 squared).
Energy is stored in matter. Matter is a form of energy. Matter
behaves according to the rules of energy. From zero hour on, and
throughout the universe, atoms and molecules have been constant-
ly forming, colliding, rearranging, and reforming. Energy, whatever
it is, moves back and forth between stored states and free states
during each of these reactions. Combinations of energy change.
The behavior of energy in the form of atoms and molecules, like
the behavior of planets and stars, is described by the laws of phys-
ics and thermodynamics. The laws of physics and thermodynamics
are expressions of whatever it is that regulates energy.3 9
Draw a balloon around any part of the material universe, no
matter how big or how small, and you have described a localized
thermodynamic system." A localized thermodynamic system is any
arbitrarily defined volume of space with energy inside. An ice cube
tray with water in it is such a system. Localized systems are tem-
perature sensitive. The more heat that is added or which exists in
a localized system, the more the system looks like a destruction
derby. Take the heat out of a system and it freezes most molecu-
lar action. Large gangly molecules have little chance of developing
or surviving on the surface of the sun because it is too hot. Large
gangly molecules have fared better on the surface of planet Earth.
Earth gradually cooled to the point where such molecules would
remain stable.4
Temperatures on Earth cooled and then leveled out, staying
within certain ranges. Molecules continued to form, rearrange,
and reform. Some of these molecular reformations began to dis-
play a cyclical characteristic. Operating in association with other
molecules and following repetitive chemical processes, a molecule
would divide and two molecules of the same type would be
formed. This was an early form of propagation. As the association
of molecules became more complex, what we think of as life came
into existence.42 Provided the temperatures of the Earth and oth-
38 The conversion factor, c. equals 186,282 miles/second, squared.
39 See generally FEVNMAN, supra note 4; GORDON M. BARROw, PHYSICAL CHEMISTRY
(1966).
40 A car engine is an example of an inanimate thermodynamic system. Energy en-
ters, work is done, and heat is released. See generally FENMAN, supra note 4; BARROW,
supra note 39.
41 See, e.g., WILLIAM F. LOOMIS, FOUR BILLION YEARS: AN ESSAY ON THE EVOLUTION
OF GENES AND ORGANISMS (1988) (with references to other authorities).
42 Id. See generally ENTROPY, INFORMATION, AND EVOLUTION, supra note 37. I accept.
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er material conditions remain the same, life forms ought to con-
tinue to function along these lines.
If this is what happened, then the question to ask is: what
sort of relationship exists between energy and life?
C. Some Observations
For humans, it's the study of the intermediate and subsequent
steps which makes the difference. The general formation and
behavior of stars and planets is important, but the action of local-
ized systems closer to home is more important. Our interests iin
things are relative. We make choices about which systems to study
and how we want to study them. How we focus on things and
what we focus on affects what we learn.43 How we focus on things
and what we focus on affects the decisions we make.
One of the ways we change our focus is by naming things. We
call the closest star the "sun." Only occasionally do we call the sun
a hydrogen furnace. Sometimes we call it our primary source of
light. We call our neighbor "Gladys." We almost never call her a
collection of several trillion organic cells. Sometimes we call her a
member of society. The words we use signify the object we are
perceiving in relation to other objects. We see things in their
relative context through our own eyes.
Relativity, however, does not equal subjectivity, although there
may be a subjective cast to the view. Einstein saw things in their
relative, but objective, context when he observed that our percep-
tion of the laws of physics was relative.4 Einstein demonstrated
that the laws of physics as written in one frame of reference could
be mathematically transformed into another frame of reference in
accordance with the physical relationship between the two frames
of reference. In other words, the laws of physics viewed from one
perspective are the same laws when viewed from another perspec-
tive, although the expression of those laws will change depending
on the perspective that is selected. 5
for the purposes of this essay, the premise that life developed from what we think of as
inanimate chemical processes, with or without the aid of a subjective will. I leave the
question open throughout the essay whether this applies equally to free will. I take no
position on the question of whether there is a distinct human spirit.
43 See. e.g., THOAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCrURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed.
1970).
44 See generally EINSTEIN, supra note 4; FEINMAN, supra note 4, at 15-1 to 16-8.
45 When I say that a glass is half empty, and you say it is half full, the two state-
ments may tell us something about our subjective attitudes about the general state of
[Vol. 69:4
COMMENT-SURVIVAL VALUES AND OBJECTIVE MORALITY
Changing our focus changes our perspective. It does not nec-
essarily change the physical rules which apply to a system. This
sets up the possibility that our rules of human conduct are in
some way an expression of other rules which are expressed in
different terms when viewed from a different perspective. We are
looking for transformations.
D. Distinguishing Inanimate Processes from Animated Ones
Energy, whatever that is, was transformed into inanimate mat-
ter according to rules. Matter is an expression, of the rules which
describe energy. Matter was further transformed into life forms.
Life forms, at least absent free will, are a further expression of the
rules which describe energy. What is the physical distinction be-
tween inanimate matter and animated matter?
Reflecting on the inanimate processes of the physical world, I
observe that the universe is expanding but the rate of expansion is
slowing down. The hot spots are growing colder. The universe will
reach a stage where it is very cold and very dark.
These facts do not seem particularly relevant to humans, at
least in the short run. But another way of visualizing the process is
to suggest that the inanimate world is winding itself down. Techni-
cally, energy is being transformed from more excited states to less
excited states.46 The sun is in an excited state. When it burns out
it will be a frigid rock.'
For inanimate processes, this process is constantly unidirec-
tional. Taking the energy of the universe as a whole, inanimate
processes spontaneously "move" in that direction which redistrib-
utes energy from more excited states to less excited states. The
sun, as a localized system, does this by irreversibly releasing or
dissipating its "excess" energy in the form of heat and light.
A localized thermodynamic system can and will move from a
less excited state to a more excited state, but only by adding ener-
gy to the system. If you turn on an electric burner under a pot of
water, energy in the form of heat moves from the burner through
the pot and into the water. The water becomes excited. If you
affairs as we individually see them. However, the two statements are objectively valid. The
first statement is a statement of fact relative to empty glasses, while the second statement
is a statement of fact relative to full glasses.
46 See generally DANIEL R BROOKS & E.O. 'ILEY, EVOLUTION AS ENTROPY (1986); EN-
TROPY, INFORMATION, AND EVOLUTION, supra note 37; JEFFREY S. WICKEN, EvOLUTION,
THERMODYN*MICS, AND INFORMATION (1987).
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remove the external source of heat, the water gradually cools
down again. The cooling process is spontaneous and unidirection-
al. While the water is in an excited state, you can use the water to
do some work. By continually adding energy to a system capable
of storing and using it, the system can do work repetitiously.47 Wa-
ter based space heating systems and steam engines are examples.
The Earth is a localized system which has a continual external
source of energy-the sun. The Earth also has an internal source
of energy which is in an excited state-the molten core. Energy
from these two sources continuously and spontaneously redistrib-
utes itself throughout the system. In the process, a variety of
things happen.
One of the things which happen is earthquakes. Another
thing which happens is the cyclical process of life.48 Physically,
both processes are obliged to function within the constraints im-
posed on them by the laws of physics and thermodynamics. In
that sense, the two processes are the same. On the other hand, we
can distinguish them.
Reflecting on the inanimate process of an earthquake, and
treating it as a localized thermodynamic system, I observe that the
earthquake works essentially like the interior of the sun. Energy is
released spontaneously through the earthquake, as light is released
spontaneously through the sun. They are both the direct result of
forces within the system which produce the effect. Reflecting on
the animated process of life forms, and treating them as localized
thermodynamic systems, I observe that: (1) energy is taken into
the system; (2) work is done internally with that energy; (3) excess
energy is stored within the system; (4) the stored energy is later
used to do work on the external world; and (5) residual energy is
given off to the external world in a variety of forms, such as heat
and other by-products.
At first these five factors may appear to distinguish living
organisms from earthquakes. As general statements, however, all
five factors appear to apply to earthquakes. Energy (pressure)
enters the earthquake area over time, causing minor subterranean
shifting. Energy is stored as tension, until the system reaches the
breaking point, and the quake occurs. The quake does work on
47 See, e.g., Frautschi, supra note 37, at 11, 12.
48 Id. See generally BROOKS & WILEY, supra note 46; ENTROPY, INFORMATION, AND
EVOLUTION. supra note 37; WICKEN. supra note 46.
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the external world (takes down buildings and freeways) and resid-
ual energy is given off as after shocks and tremors. We can see
that the five factors also apply to the sun, if we consider that
energy originally came into that particular location in empty space
during the period in which stars and planets were formed. A com-
parison to tea kettles and steam engines reveals the same thing.
I am next tempted to try to uniformly distinguish animated
from inanimate systems based on the type of work they do on the
external world (4th factor). While this approach may help distin-
guish between different types of organisms (gophers and
groundhogs do not build dams like beavers and humans do), it
does not seem to uniformly distinguish animated systems as a lass
from inanimate systems as a class. Although the element of free
choice may distinguish humans from earthquakes, how, with re-
spect to the external work done, are organisms that eat oil spills
and then die (transforming material objects in the process) fun-
damentally different from an earthquake which moves land around
for awhile and then stops, or from a solvent which dissolves anoth-
er compound until there is nothing left to dissolve? How are bac-
teria which speed the process of decay in a compost pile funda-
mentally different, with respect to the external work done, from
an inorganic catalyst that speeds a chemical reaction?
A more uniform distinction appears to surface in the type of
work an animated system does internally (2nd factor). The particu-
lar earthquake is never reconstituted, nor does it produce similar
earthquakes. On the other hand, two of the fundamental things
living organisms do, is to (i) reconstitute themselves and (ii) pro-
duce similar organisms. In particular, organisms grow in size, de-
velop in accordance with certain patterns, routinely reconstitute
damaged and worn out parts, develop defense mechanisms, and
position themselves to do their share in propagating similar organ-
isms. This is a general statement I will use for the physical process
of survival. The rules are all physical.
I observe, as I did in the introduction, that the physical pro-
cess of survival is both linear and cyclical. I observe further that
whatever work may be done by an organism, either externally or
internally, the ability to do such work is conditioned on the
organism's continued existence.
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IV. DEVELOPING A THEORY OF OBJECTIVE MORALITY
A. A Visualization
Experiment #4. A human is standing at the edge of a clearing.
It is dusk. The cold night air creates a fine mist which dances on
the tops of the grasses. A lone wolf enters from the back right
side of the clearing, heading generally towards the back left side.
The human watches the wolf move across the clearing. Half way
across, the wolf stops and directs its attention towards the human.
The wolf gazes quietly at the human for a few moments, and then
continues on her way.
Count the number of relationships you see in this picture.
B. Objectivity and Subjectivity; Objective Ends
Having made general observations about the physical world, I
will try to relate those observations more specifically to life forms.
The purpose is to narrow our focus on how much of an animated
system is objective and how much is subjective. Examining a life
form with only one cell and comparing it to multi-celled organ-
isms, including humans, will be helpful. In the process I will devel-
op definitions of objectivity and subjectivity and define objective
ends in terms of consequences.
Some single-celled organisms, such as amoeboid protozoans,
periodically bifurcate into two separate and distinct single-celled
organisms." The process is influenced in large part by DNA mol-
ecules, which are contained within sub-cell structures known as
chromosomes. Each DNA molecule contains thousands of coordi-
nated groupings of atoms, which we call genes. A DNA molecule
is a chain of specific subgroupg of atoms. The sequencing of these
subgroups, or genes,, and the specific atom groups within the
genes appears to equate to a set of instructions which guides the
bifurcation (cell division) and controls the formation of the new.
protozoans." The chain works like a computer code or computer
punch tape full of instructions. Once formed, the new protozoans
49 See 0. ROGER ANDERSON. COMPARATIVE PROTOZOOLOGY 375-92 (1988); RENATO
BASERGA, THE BIOLOGY OF CELL REPRODUCTION 46-58 (1985). See generally THE BIOLOGY
OF AMOEBA (Kwang W. Jeon ed., 1973); MICHAEL A. SLEIGH, PROTOZOA AND OTHER
PROTISTS (1989).
50 See generally DULBECCO. supra note 15 (general reference on the operation of DNA
and genetics in the cell environment). See infra note 56 for a summary of the genetic
coding within a double helix DNA molecule which guides the construction of a body.
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begin to function according to the individual biochemical process-
es they were programmed to possess. They continue to function
within the constraints of these processes and within the constraints
of the general laws of physics and thermodynamics."
Similar biochemical processes routinely guide and direct the
development of living embryos, first into self-sustaining life forms,
and then into adults of that particular type of animal. The num-
ber of cells in multi-celled organisms grows through bifurcation.
Unlike protozoans, the cells in multi-celled animals remain togeth-
er and operate as a unit. The human body grows by cell division
into a coordinated and integrated array of thousands of billions of
cells. For humans, this requires the mathematical equivalent of
approximately 60 rounds of cell division, although some cells di-
vide more often than others.5 2 Physical differences between the
various types of animals and between individual animals of the
same type are traced in large part to differences in the size and
structure of the DNA molecules, and in particular to the sequenc-
ing of atoms and genes within those molecules. In short, if you
change the instructions coded in the DNA, you change the physi-
cal formation and physical operation of the animal.53
Related biochemical processes operate to maintain individual
organisms. Replacing worn out cells is one example. Breaking
down complex carbohydrates and producing and regulating the
flow of proteins, amino acids and hormones are other examples.
Enzymes are produced which catalyze biochemical reactions. Some
of these processes depend on the structure of DNA molecules,
while 'others may predate the development of DNA processes."
Maintaining an organism is not a once a week or once a month
process. With humans, millions upon billions of such biochemical
processes are occurring every minute in every body.55 Some of
these processes require thousands of associated chemical reac-
51 See generally ENTROPY, INFORMATION. AND EVOLUTION, supra note 37.
52 The body has more than 10,000,000,000,000 (10 trillion) individual cells, each
carrying on a life cycle of its own. Every minute about 3 billion cells die. -3 WORLD
BOOK ENCXCLOPEDIA 326-39 (1990). See generally ADVANCED CELL BIOLOGY (Lazar M.
Schuartz & Miguel M. Azar eds., 1981).
53 Behaviorial differences are influenced by other factors in addition to DNA compo-
sition. See generally DULBECCO, supra note 15: ECCLES. supra note 2. For a summary de-
scription of the function of DNA and genetic codes, see infra note 56.
54 See generally LOOMIS, supra note 41, at 1-100.
55 The blood system alone looks like hundreds of Los Angeles freeways at rush
hour, except that the traffic of the blood moves. Compare 3 WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA,
supra note 52.
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tions." Animal bodies are virtual beehives of complex but coor-
dinated physical activity.
Of particular interest, in light of our general theme, are the
related biochemical processes which guide and direct the develop-
ment of the human brain. The brain consists of billions upon
billions of neurons and associated cells.5 ' Each neuron contains
tens of thousands of locations, called synapses, which transmit
electrical impulses from one neuron to another with the aid of
thousands of biochemical reactions. The neurons are "wired" to-
gether in a complicated but physically coordinated network which
extends throughout all parts of the body. This bioelectrical net-
work operates around the clock, performing hundreds of interre-
lated functions which connect perceptions to responses. Various
brain parts perform or support specific ,functions, such as receiving
optical impulses from the eye or thinking. Other brain parts re-
spond to physical stimuli or initiate physical desires to eat, sleep,
have sex, or fight. Information is taken in, processed, and respons-
es are generated. Many of these responses are actualized without
conscious thought. The structure and operation of brain parts"
56 Each human cell contains 23 pairs of chromosomes, which contain the human
genes, as well as hundreds of other constituent parts. Id. Each cell has trillions of atoms.
There are at least 30,000 human genes. ECCLES, supra note 2, at 1.
A gene is a sequence of base units which lie between the two strands of the dou-
ble-helix DNA molecule. There are only four base units, referred to as letters: A, T, C.
and G. Sequences of these letters constitute a gene. Linearly, the DNA molecule contains
a large number of genes which act as instructions to the cell's activity. A principal activi-
ty is building proteins according to these instructions. The proteins which are built deter-
mine the shape and function of the body and its parts. See DULBECCO, supra note 15, at
1-41, 61-101, (machinery of the cell and DNA function); ECCLES, supra note 2, at 1-7.
A DNA molecule or strand of encrypted code in a bacterium has approximately 1.5
million letters (A. T. C and G). Each human DNA molecule has approximately 3.5 billion
letters. Id. at 1; DULBECCO, supra note 15, at 100. Each chromsome contains a specific
-collection of DNA molecules with different sequencing of letters. Different combinations
and sequences of letters define a single gene. Each letter represents a comination of
atoms which maintain an identity. The different genes control different aspects of the
body through a process of translating the encrypted code into different combinations of
proteins. Id. at 70-83. The combinations and sequencing of the constituent part of genes
can be modified by random error and other forms of mutation. These modifications
account in large part for the diversity in life. Id. at 99-125.
Although the various cells are specialized, the operation of most cells can be
analogized to that of a manufacturing plant with hundreds of separate assembly process-
es, along with the necessary raw material receiving and finished product shipping opera-
tions networked into the transportation systems of the body. Compare DULBECCO, supra
note 15, at 1-41, 61-101.
57 See generally DULBECCO, supra note 15, at 339-70 (machinery of the brain); ECCLES.
supra note 2; PRIBRAM, supra note 2 (extensive discussion and descriptions of dendritic
microprocesses and networking within the brain).
58 DULBECCO, supra note 15, at 342-43. See generally PRIBRAM, supra note 2; THE SNN-
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are at least in part a function of the instructions encoded within
DNA molecules. Those instructions guided the construction, devel-
opment and initial operation of the brain.
The point I want to make is that the biochemical and electri-
cal processes of the brain appear to be at least as objective as the
processes which control the bifurcation of single-celled organisms,
or which control the bifurcation of cells in multi-celled animals, or.
which operate to maintain individual organisms. I make this state-
ment even though the cumulative or coordinated operation of
these brain-related processes produce or reflect a variety of pat-
terns of behavior we ordinarily refer to as subjective'. Included in
such behavior are the adoption or affirmation of moral and other
rules of human conduct.
What do I mean by "at least as objective?" What does "objec-
tive" mean, and what is the objective of the physical processes
involved? Some discussion is required to answer these questions in
relation to the general theme of the essay.
One effect or consequence of the bifurcation process of a
protozoan is that there is one additional single-celled organism in
the universe. We might ask what purpose is served by the produc-
tion of this additional organism? Phrased in this way, this new
question prompts our minds towards past, present and future set-
tings in which protozoans find themselves. Our thoughts are di-
rected to considerations of how protozoans relate to their sur-
rounding environment, and to considerations of the history of
protozoans particularly and the history of the physical world gener-
ally. We answer the question in context. We find that our orienta-
tion towards time becomes relevant.
Within the context of the physical world and its history, we
observe that individual organisms eventually die. We observe that
they die from a variety of internal and external causes and that
the surrounding environment can be hostile. What we mean is
that similar organisms have died in the past and appear likely to
die in the future, and that the surrounding environment is one of
the factors determining life or death.
Bifurcation, or cell division, seems to have no direct conse-
quence for the individual protozoan, outside of the act itself, but
without bifurcation or an equivalent process there would eventual-
ly be no protozoans. I generally conclude that a central effect or
APTIC ORGANIZATION OF THE BRAIN. supra note 21; ROLAND, supra note 11.
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consequence of bifurcation is perpetuation of that particular type or
species of protozoans. I note that this process requires the current
generation to produce the next generation.
I might next be persuaded to identify the word "effect" or
"consequence" with the word "purpose," regardless of any other
effects, consequences or purposes protozoans may have or may
serve within the physical world. In thinking this through, I make a
mental note that the word "purpose" has a connotation which
needs to be dealt with. By a similar process I conclude that a
central effect or consequence of the internal biochemical process-
es which sustain protozoans is prolongation or reconstitution of
individual protozoans, regardless of any other effects or purposes
these particular protozoans may have. If the only effects are pro-
longation of the individual and perpetuation of the species, then
there are no other questions. If there are other effects, then the
existence and significance of other "purposes" becomes an open
question with which we must deal.
The problem with the word "purpose" is that the word usually
connotes intention. Intention often connotes a subject who has
designed or intends an outcome. Since the involvement of subjects
goes to a central part of my inquiry, I need to keep the various
connotations of the words I use distinct. I will therefore dispense
with the word "purpose" except where the word's objective or
subjective connotation is clear from the context.
With the workings of our protozoan in mind, definitions of
objectivity and subjectivity are in order. As a working definition, I
will say that a process is objective if, after it is set in motion, it
operates without the immediate support or aid of a free willed
subject and produces material or physical results. The physical
results of an objective process are its consequences. Each conse-
quence is an "objective end." An objective end is a classifiable set
of consequences. Where there is a physically based process at
work, the language and concepts we ordinarily use allow me to
characterize that process by reference to one or more of its conse-
quences or objective ends. I recognize that such characterizations
may only partially reflect the total operation or effects of the pro-
cess. I observe that objective processes may also be designed or
used by free willed subjects, in which case it is the design or use,
not the process itself, which is subjective.
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I further observe that the consequences of objective processes
may trigger other objective processes which have their own materi-
al and ph ,sical effects, thus creating a chain of objective events. I
observe that the consequences of objective processes, like the de-
sign and use of such processes, may create opportunities for sub-
jective actions by subjects capable of taking such actions.
While it may be grammatically correct to refer to behavior as
subjective any time there is a grammatical subject, what I mean
here by subjective behavior is that the subject involved has the
ability to freely decide between alternative actions. Rational
thought processes which generate suggestions for alternative ac-
tions may be physical. The direction given to rational thought by
act of free will is subjective. This may be a narrow definition of
subjectivity. It is to this definition I intend to refer when I use the
expression "free will."
To illustrate the objectivity/subjectivity distinction, the produc-
tion of. the second protozoan in some manner consequentially
affect's the overall demand for protozoan food and the quantity
and composition of the chemicals in the surrounding environ-
ment. Although I may say this will have a subjective effect on the
future of protozoans, this is loose talk. What I mean is that partic-
ular entities, protozoans, will be particularly but objectively affect-
ed. The fact that protozoans may respond in a variety of ways to
the new state of affairs does not make those responses subjective.
Protozoans, as far as we know, do not have the ability to freely
decide how to respond to changing circumstances.59 Therefore,
protozoans do not have subjective opportunities for action. As far
as we know, the responses of protozoans are either randomly de-
termined or specifically dictated by internally established patterns
of responses to physical stimuli or both. If the pattern of the re-
sponse is specifically determined, the process works like one bil-
liard ball striking another, generating a single objective outcome.
If the response is random, the process may work like throwing
dice. Although we won't know the specific outcome until after the
event, there may be a statistically predictable distribution of physi-
cal responses.
Another way of describing the consequences which proceed
from the' introduction of the* second protozoan into the physical
59 See generally ANDERSON. supra note 49 at 375-92; THE BIOLOGY OF AIOEBA. supra
note 49: SLEIGH, sn/ira note 49.
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world is to say that the entire balance or configuration of the
universe has just changed-albeit only "at the margin." The objec-
tive effects on humans of this single marginal change are likely to
be inconsequential. But I observe that the unchecked objective
consequences proceeding from a single marginal event might be
more dramatic (at least for humans) if the particular organism
involved was an AIDS virus. I similarly observe that a single nucle-
ar explosion in any one of a number of locations would have its
own specific set of dramatic consequences.
Humans, unlike protozoans, are said to have free will. In such
a case, I can see that objective consequences, past or future, cre-
ate subjective opportunities for actions by humans. Humans can
take advantage of the consequences they like or freely do some-
thing to forestall or counteract consequences they don't like.'
Returning to the issue of the biochemical processes operating
within the brains of humans, and in light of our discussion of
protozoans, objectivity and subjectivity, and our general knowledge
of the history of the physical world, I conclude the following. If
there is a physically based process at work within humans, then
there may be one or more objective ends for the process even
though the process creates opportunities for subjective action. I
am further prompted, by inferences drawn from our 'general
knowledge of physical processes, to say that there ought to be such
objective ends, because I am not aware of any physical processes
that do not produce material or objective consequences. Accord-
ingly, I seek to discover what those objective ends are.
Observing that physical processes produced mechanisms within
other life forms which sustain, defend and propagate those life
forms (survival mechanisms developed through adaption, training
and DNA modifications),61 and accepting the premise that the
human brain has developed in stages over time, I conclude that
one of the objective ends of the physical processes of both the
lower and the higher level brain functions is to enhance the pros-
pects of physical survival.
I observe that these processes include such things as desires,
wants, needs, sensory perceptions, emotions, instincts, trained re-
sponses, memory, consciousness, speech, imagination, rational
60 Humans are limited to efforts to forestall or counteract objective consequences.
We cannot physically undo them. If efforts to forestall or counteract events do not work
their intended purposes, objective consequences will take their full effect based on the
physical probabilities involved.
61 See generally MAYR, supra note 15.
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thought, artistic expression, moral evaluation, religious expression
and free will.62 A number of these processes appear to be physi-
cal. They appear to be the objective consequences of how energy
reacts to energy. I remind myself that objective processes may be
used for subjective purposes and may have other objective ends.
I offer as circumstantial evidence to support my conclusion
(that the physical processes of the brain enhance survival) the fact
that the human species continues to survive after millions of years,
that humans appear to dominate most other species, and that the
physical processes of the human brainappear to have contributed
to the relative success of the human survival system. If the human
species becomes extinct as a consequence of its objective or sub-
jective use of its mental capacities, then I would probably have to
conclude that the higher level mental processes of the human
brain were not a long-run enhancement relative to physical surviv-
al. 6
3
The question remains whether the process of adopting rules
of human conduct is part of the objective processes of the brain.
If so, modem rules of moral conduct, or at least some of them,
may be an expression of the physical rules of survival as described
in the general biochemistry of living organisms.
C. Rules of Human Conduct
What do the rules which describe the behavior of physical
objects have to do with the rules of conduct devised by humans?
To bring out the underlying issues, I will explore the relationship
between descriptive and normative rules of conduct. The purpose
of this section is to show that a continuum of rulemaking process-
es may exist, with descriptive rules at one end and normative rules
of human conduct at the other.
62 The conceptual dividing line I am using is that line which generally distinguishes
humans from other living organisms. Rationality, consciousness, the ability to communi-
cate syntactically, and free will are higher level brain functions. The point at which hu-
mans began to tell stories around a campfire and to draw pictures on the walls of caves
probably points to the transition period. Compare Thought Experiment #2, supra Part II.A.
See generally CHARLES J. LUMSDEN & EDWARD 0. WILSON, GENES, MIND, AND CULTURE
(1981); CREATIVrIY/ANTHROPOLOGY (Smadar Lavie et al. eds.. 1993); HUNTERS AND GATH-
ERERS (Tim Ingold et al. eds., 1988) (in two volumes); USE OF TOOLS BY HUMAN AND
NON-HUMAN PRIMATES (A. Berthelet & J. Chavaillon eds., 1993); WILSON, supra note 4.
63 I exclude the lower brain functions because such functions have a much longer
history of functioning successfully with respect to non-free willed organisms. See supra
note 62.
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The distinction I draw between descriptive rules of conduct
and normative rules of conduct is essentially one of volition. The
law of gravity is an example of a descriptive rule of conduct. Our
mathematical formulation of the law of gravity describes; within
some margin of error, the effects of the actual force of gravity on
material objects. In the absence of all other intervening forces,
whether gravity is viewed as emanating from matter or is viewed as
acting independently on matter, and taking the material attributes
of the objects involved as given, the force of gravity so described
can be said to absolutely control the future behavior of those
objects. The law of gravity describes one of the ways in which ob-
jects in the universe are physically connected to each other
through time.' No decision is involved, nor is any decision rele-
vant, even if one of those objects is a human.
An example of a normative rule is "one ought not steal."
Such a expression is not ordinarily intended to describe a force
which acts independently and absolutely on material objects. A
person might steal despite the rule. All that is apparently required
is the taking of an action in contradiction to the rule. One cannot
so defy the force of gravity, although one can take an action
which counteracts it.
65
Our purposes in formulating or expressing normative rules
are usually different than with descriptive rules. We might say that
we intend normative rules to describe correct behavior. If so, the
various connotations of the word "correct" will have to be un-
packed since "correct" necessarily refers to some undefined set of
criteria. This concept of criteria for correctness will later become
central to our inquiry into objective morality. One of the things I
think we commonly mean to do when formulating the words of a
normative rule is to describe a rule or standard the knowledge of
which is intended to influence a decision. I will refer to this as
the first, or influencing of conformity, use of a normative rule. As a
separate matter, and under some circumstances, we also employ
the rule as a measure of an attribute we refer to as the "moral
worth" of an action or an actor. I will refer to this as the second,
or evaluative, use of a normative rule.
The predicate for the first intended purpose of a normative
rule is volition by someone capable of making a choice in light of,
or in recognition of, the existence of the rule.66 Questions of
64 See generally FEYNMAN, supra note 4, at 7-1 to 7-11.
65 For example, opening a parachute within the earth's atmosphere.
66 As to a specific notion of a rule of recognition, see HART, supra note 1, at 92-
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moral worth do not need to enter the picture.' However, if the
actor is not aware of the rule or lacks free will, the rule as a con-
scious matter cannot serve its intended purpose of guiding or
influencing behavior in conformance with the stated norm.' In
this view, a normative rule does not describe a force which strictly
controls objects, as does gravity. We avoid stealing by deciding not
to steal, and then not stealing.
The predicate for the "moral worth" or evaluative use of a
normative rule is ordinarily. an action or an inclination to act in
opposition to, or in fulfillment of, a prescribed or proscribed
conduct. I observe that some humans will withhold moral assess-
ment where the actor acts without free will or without recognition
of the moral rule. Under such circumstances, the act is treated as
morally neutral and the actor is not held morally deficient. On
the other hand, some humans in the same circumstances will
assign a negative or positive moral worth to the act or the actor,
regardless of the actor's state of mind. The act itself is a negative
act, or the act itself is a postive act. In this latter situation we have
disassociated moral worth from volition.
It is our ability to change, apparently at will, the- location and
conditions of the attribute we call "moral worth," and the fact that
different persons will ascribe different degrees of "worth" to the
same set of facts, that generally leads us to conclude that this
moral attribute, whatever physical basis it may have, is not a physi-
cal attribute of the same kind as is hardness or color. The hard-
ness of steel appears to reflect a physical quality of an external
object, although I recognize that quality with my mind. The moral
worth of an act of thievery appears to reflect an attitude of my
mind, although I need an external event in order to give that
attitude any concrete meaning. Hardness appears to be established
independently from human minds, while moral worth appears to
107.
67 After reciting the is/ought distinction, Hume in his next sentence concludes that
humans had to have a common sentiment or moral sense: "Thus the course of the argu-
ment leads us to conclude, that since vice and virtue are not discoverable merly by rea-
son, or the comparison of ideas, it must be by means of some impression or sentiment
they occasion, that we are able to mark the difference betwixt them." HUME, supra note
4, at 471. See TOULMIN, supra note 25, at 20-21 (discussion of this point).
68 We can train infants who have not yet developed their capacity for free willed
decisions, but in that case the influence of conformity was on the parents.
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be a mental variable dependent on the status of a particular mind.
We generally conclude from this that moral worth is a subjective attrib-
ute of the human mind somehow generated by the human will.
Yet both the hardness situation and the thievery situation connect
humans in some fashion to the physical world. It may be that
there are four or more variables involved: the physical hardness of
the steel, and the hardness I perceive; and the physical or objective
value of an act of stealing and the value I perceive. A physically
determined relationship between these variables may exist and
needs to be explored.
Somewhere between our descriptive rules and our normative
rules are other rules which are not so easily classified as either. At
the subatomic level the ordinary Newtonian laws of physics do not
apply. Outcomes cannot be said to have a predetermined cause
and effect relationship where individual subatomic events occur
within a relevant space. This is not because we are unable to ob-
serve the events or because the act of observation interferes with
the events in progress.69 Instead there is an indeterminancy to
the individual events themselves which is intrinsic to the nature of
subatomic particles and to energy. Yet this indeterminancy does
not prohibit us from statistically predicting the outcomes of large
numbers of such events. We cannot predict where a particular
photon of light will hit a screen, but we can predict what the
pattern is going to look like. We make these predictions in accor-
dance with the rules of quantum mechanics.' The foundation for
these predictions are probability distributions. Probability distribu-
tions are one way of describing the existing status of physical reali-
ty.7' They also allow us to connect conditions as they are to con-
ditions as they will be.
69 See HERBERT, supra note 15; BAGGOTT, supra note 15. See generally WERNER
HEISENBERG, PHYSICS & PHILOSOPHY (1958).
70 See PEAT, supra note 15, at 55 (discussing wave functions and probability distribu-
tions), FEYNMAN, supra note 4, at 6-1 to 6-10.
71 As an example, we ordinarily say that electrons orbit their nuclei. This is loose
talk. All we can say, in reality, is that the location of an electron within an atom is de-
scribed by its probability distribution. This does not mean that a material electron is lo-
cated somewhere but we don't know where. It means something closer to the statement
that it is located everywhere or nowhere. One way to help visualize this is to say that the
electron is "smeared" around the nucleus as described by its probability distribution. We
can within empirically determined margins of error physically describe the behavior of
electrons by the statistical probabilities related to the physical processes involved, although
the behavior of a particular electron remains uncertain. See HERBERT, supra note 15, at
122-29.
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Without the predictability of the macroscopic or collective
effects of the underlying physical forces involved, we could not, as
in Thought Experiment #1, fuel our nuclear submarine, keep it sub-
merged, pilot it through the narrows, or rely on our sonar equip-
ment to tell us the shape and size of surroundings we cannot
otherwise see by the human eye. We rely for each of these on
probabilities. How you decided the question in Thought Experi-
ment #1 most likely depended on how you assessed the various
probabilities involved.
Perhaps related to this are our- formulations of rules which
describe some of the behavior patterns of life forms. On the one
hand, while the individual behavior of a single-celled protozoan
among the hundreds of thousands of such protozoans in a droplet
of water containing a limited food supply is unpredictable and
perhaps indeterminate, various aspects of the behavior of the
entire group are statistically predictable and governed by the col-
lective results of. the forces which emanate from their own bio-
chemistry.72 Notions of free will seems inapplicable. The forces
which control the observed behavior are at least partially described
in -the genetics. As a result, the behavior of protozoans relates
more readily to descriptive rules than to normative rules.
On the other hand, the descriptive rules of a wolf pack'hunt-
ing and feeding on caribou take on fiormative aspects. The pack
appears to follow rules about which animals lead the chase or
ought to lead the chase and which animals feed first or ought to
feed first. Some wolf behaviorial instructions appear wired in by
genetic processes, as with protozoans, and some instructions ap-
pear to be mapped in through training and reinforced through
acts of retribution or power.73 We observe as a general rule that
physical recognition of particular patterns of behavior or other
stimuli often produce predetermined responses. Yet some, if not
all, of these responses can be overridden by training. The process
of training' takes on some of the characteristics of influencing
decisions to achieve conformity to social norms. I will refer to
such physically amendable rules as quasi-normative rules.
These quasi-normative wolf pack rules appear to be incorpo-
rated directly into the physiology of the animal. By that I mean
72 We may be able to analogize this to actuarial tables, for example.
73 See WOLF AND MAN, EVOLUTION IN PARALLEL. supra note 10, at 81-106; L. DAVID
MECH. THE WOLF: THE ECOLOGY AND BEHAVIOR OF AN ENDANGERED SPECIES 68-110. See
generally THE BEHAVIOR AND ECOLOGY OF WOLVES (Erich Klinghammer ed., 1979).
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that they appear to operate automatically. 4 Sometimes, however,
there are time delays, as if the wolf was trying to decide what it
wanted to do next. Our full notion of free will seems inapplicable,
but some aspects of a wolf's behavior seem to be related to our
notion of free will. Recognition that a second wolf is feeding out
of turn usually but not always triggers retribution. Hunger ordi-
narily triggers not just a hunt, but a collaborative hunt. This
collabortive effort takes place in accordance with a generally pre-
determined pattern, but the pattern and outcome of a particular
hunt seem to vary based on "decisions" made by various wolves
during the hunt. Signs of volitional behavior exist, but the wolf's
volitional capabilities and actual decisionmaking abilities, if any, do
not match that of a human's. The wolf's quasi-normative rules
function like normative rules yet are descriptive of the internal
and external forces which control the wolf's behavior, and there-
fore the wolf's future.
Some distinctions and similarities between wolves and prehis-
toric humans, and between prehistoric and modern humans, are
brought out by Thought Experiment #2. How you resolved the ques-
tion most likely depended on the degree of volitional and
decisionmaking capabilities you ascribed to the prehistoric human.
The more wolf-like and hungry you imagined you were, the more
likely you went for the meat, hoping to beat a fast retreat. The
greater the decisionmaking capabilities you granted yourself, the
longer you would have spent weighing the alternatives and the
odds. If you imagined yourself having more modern human
decisionmaking capabilities, you would probably have discounted
your past clan experiences as to their treatment of thieves and
outsiders, as this might have little bearing on the unknown ways of
the aliens. A prehistoric human would probably lack this degree of
perception, and might have accepted his or her own clan's way,
through training or a sense of obligation, as a conscious or uncon-
scious guide for behavior.75 If so, she or he might well have
walked, perhaps with temerity, into the camp and voluntarily sub-
mitted, hoping to eventually be assimilated-unless, of course, you
viewed yourself as a strong male. If so, the fear of death might
have driven you away.
74 See generally PRIBRAM, supra note 2.
75 See generally LUMSDEN & WILSON, supra note 62; HUNTERs AND GATHERERS, supra
note 62; PFEIFFER, supra note 4.
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In any case, it is unlikely that our prehistoric human would
have seen the problem as one involving moral worth. This is not
to say that prehistoric humans did not have spiritual taboos and
early forms of religious convictions. Spiritual and religious experi-
ences and expressions are a likely source of normative rules in
pre-modem cultures. Another likely source would be the expres-
sions and actions of secular leaders." The sense of obligation to
follow rules, which is in itself a 'rule, may have developed as a
result of spiritual or religious training. On the other hand, the
sense of obligation to follow rules and the desire to conform may
have their roots in quasi-normative rules, as a result of trained or
instinctual responses. Although prehistoric or pre-modern humans
may not have distinguished issues on the basis of a developed
sense of moral worth, they are likely to have distinguished' be-
tween the sources of power behind spiritual and secular rules. The
question remains whether there are any physical explanations
underlying the development of pre-modern normative rules.
It is my contention that any modem, coherent theory of mo-
rality which purports to be objectively based must at least account
for the apparent existence of quasi-normative rules, such as the
wolf pack rules, and the potential transformation of such rules.
into pre-modern normative ones, such as primitive tribal rules.
What are the sources of quasi- and pre-modem normative rules,
and what function, if any, do they serve? What relationship exists
between such rules and modem rules of human conduct?
D. Three Connotations of Ought
I introduced, in Part II.C., three connotations of the word
"ought." The first related to probabilities, the second related to
making decisions, and the third related to notions of moral value.
Here I explore the relationship between these connotations and
their relationship to physical survival.
The first connotation is implied in the statement, "the sun
ought to rise tomorrow." Why can we assert that? We can assert it
because there is a high physical probability that the sun will rise
tomorrow." Why do we say that there is a high probability that
76 See generally EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE (Joseph
W. Swain trans., 1915); ELVIN HATCH, THEORIES OF MAN AND CULTURE (1973): ADOLF E.
JENSEN. MYrH AND CULT AMONG PRIMrrVE PEOPLES (Marianna T. Choldin & Wolfgang
Weissleder trans., 1963) (1951); HUNTERS AND GATHERERS, supra note 62; PFEIFFER, supra
note 4; WILSON, supra note 4.
77 This is subject to our general assumption of continuiiy in physical rules. See supra
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the sun will rise tomorrow? We say it because we believe we know
things about the history of the sun and the rotation of the Earth,
and from these "facts" we infer things about the future. The ought
statement, in other words, has been truncated. It needs a because
clause. Without a because clause, the ought statement does not
reveal its grounds. By expanding the statement, we get:
Sentence 1 The sun ought to rise tomorrow, because we
know A, B and C about the consequences of
planetary motions in relation to the sun, and it
follows that the sun will probably rise tomorrow.
The basis for our assertion is now revealed. We can proceed to
debate the probabilities involved relative to the physical conse-
quences of planetary motions in relation to the sun.
The other two connotations of "ought" ordinarily involve
humans. The two connotations are implied, but not necessarily
present, in a statement like "Gret ought not steal." We could
mean that Gret ought to make a decision not to steal for reasons
unrelated to moral worth, or we could be implying that there is a
moral value associated with stealing regardless of any decision
which is made about it. We don't know which connotation applies,
because the statement is truncated. It is missing its because clause.
The grounds for our assertion are nowhere to be seen.
Observe what happens to the connotations if we complete the
second ought statement as follows:
Sentence 2 Gret ought not steal, because we know X, Y and
Z about the consequences of human tribes
which tolerate stealing, and it follows that Gret
will probably not steal.
What I no longer see in this version is the moral value connota-
tion. It's been driven out of my mind by the connotations of the
word "probably" in relation to the word "consequences." My no-
tion of moral value does not readily associate with the idea of
probable consequences. My notion of moral value associates more
readily with the idea of intrinsic worth or with rules which apply
regardless of consequences. Although the moral connotation seems
note 29 and accompanying text.
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to be gone, I notice that a confusion has entered into the sen-
tence between the first two connotations of "ought."
Why will Gret probably not steal? Is it because it is not likely
to occur to someone in Gret's situation to steal? Or is it because
Gret is not likely to decide to steal?
If it is the first situation, then Gret's behavior is being de-
scribed by a quasi-normative rule (wolf pack rules). If it is the sec-
ond situation, then the implication is that Gret has the ability to
decide to steal but is not likely to do so for some reason. Before
proceeding to the second situation, I want to explore the implica-
tions of the first one.
Free will is not needed for organisms to function. The squir-
rel buries acorns for the winter, the beaver builds a dam, and
wolves hunt caribou without free will and without any obvious
foresight of impending physical events. There is no planning.
There is only doing. In the process of doing, rules develop.
The actions which non-free willed organisms take are de-
scribed by rules written into the physiology of the brains of those
organisms.78 What these rules appear to be are pattern recogni-
tion-pattern response cycles. Incoming patterns from the physical
world trigger response patterns in the brain which energize an
action. No one wrote these rules.
Rules of the brain, for non-free willed organisms, appear to
have developed and survived as a consequence of two objective
processes. First, response patterns appear to develop within the
brain according to the rules which describe or regulate the bio-
chemistry of the organism. This may be random trial and error, or
there may be some specific direction to the process, or both. By
both I mean that there is some specific probability distribution to
the biochemical events which produce new response patterns. Not
all organisms develop the same rules. This accounts for the diver-
sity we see in life forms. Diversity appears to be an objective end
of the biochemical processes of organisms which enhances the
prospects that some form of life survives.79
Second, rules of the brain appear to survive as a consequence
of an objective test response patterns that support or at least do not
detract from continued survival continue to exist. A corollary to
78 See Figures 2 & 3 supra text accompanying note 16.
79 Diversity in ideas may also be an advantage in a culture. See generally DULBECCO,
supra note 15, at 99-126 (diversity is the manner in which new genetic combinations are
developed and tested).
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this test seems to be: those response patterns which enhance the
odds of survival will gradually be favored over time.8"
The physical rules of survival and the physical law of probabil-
ities would appear to be sufficient to account for this test. Survival
is a function not only of reconstitution but also of propagation.
Organisms which do not develop rules sufficient to overcome the
desires and skills of other organisms with which they interact are
likely to disappear through diminishing rates of propagation. Sur-
vival is therefore a function, in part, of the desires, behavior pat-
terns and rules of other organisms. The behavior patterns of or-
ganisms are interconnected.
Some of the rules written into the brain we call instincts.
Other rules I have called trained responses. Instincts. seem to be
response patterns linked very tightly to incoming physical patterns.
They are linked so tightly that they seem to operate automatically,
almost instantaneously. Some of these instincts are powerful influ-
ences on the "will" of an animal: They seem to serve functions
related directly to survival (fight or flight responses, mating rituals,
primping, territorial protection, territorial expansion, resource
accumulation, aggression, possessiveness). They can also from time
to time get the animal into trouble and lead to death. Instincts
tend to paint with a broad stroke, and if they are in error they
can place survival in jeopardy.
Perhaps instincts are brain functions which can't be directly
amended. Trained responses, on the other hand, seem to be
amendable. They involve learning. They can be overwritten with
new responses. Animals can be taught tricks and trained into rou-
tines. Left alone, they learn their own tricks and develop their
own routines. Using computer language, instincts appear to be
hard wired, while trained responses appear to work like software
programs recorded on a mass storage device. The circuits for all
this are the vast networks of neural synapses contained in the
brain.'
80 Charles Darwin defined natural selection as "[t]he preservation of favorable varia-
tions and the rejection of injurious variations . . . ." MAYR, supra note 15, at 95, quoting
CHARLES DARIN, ORIGIN OF THE SPECIES (Harvard University Press 1964) (1859). The'
objective test as I've drafted it is intended to be a more general statement related to the
adoption and success or continuation of rules of survival. It is intended, as a general
notion, to take into account other theories of species evolution, including adaption theo-
ries. See MAYR, supra note 15, at 127-264.
81 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. See also PRIBRAM, supra note 2.
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Trained responses appear to be able to override instinctual
responses, at least some of the time. Speculating, it seems that ani-
mals can set up response cycles designed to compete with instinc-
tual responses or catch internal desires as if they were external
patterns and override the responses which would otherwise have
made it back to the external world.
Not stealing may be such a trained response. The instinct that
supports survival is for the animal to take what it needs to survive.
If the animal did not have that instinct, it would soon starve to
death. But if what the animal needs is in the possession of anoth-
er animal, responding directly to instinct may jeopardize survival.
If both animals are needed to hunt caribou (team efforts enhanc-
ing the odds of survival), then a rule against stealing coupled with
rule under which everyone eats may gradually be favored over
time. Such social rules, in the form of trained responses, enhance
the odds of survival for the participants in the social system.
There does not need to be any subjective will or subjective
purpose involved. Issues of moral worth do not need to be
brought in. What is needed is a mechanism'by which brains de-
velop, test and retain successful survival techniques. The develop-
ment of the ability to institute trained overrides appears to be an
objective end or consequence of the gradual development of hu-
man brain functions. Perhaps both the lower and the higher brain
functions of humans developed in response to the physical forces
of survival, the lower functioning according to some older rules
and the higher functioning according to some newer rules. Both
instincts and trained responses involve the use of power and ener-
gy. -Both processes appear to be expressions of how energy reacts
to energy."
In such a case, I contend that there is no fundamental dis-
tinction between the sun rising, Sentence 1, and not stealing,
Sentence 2, although the probabilities which describe the physical
processes change.3 The rule against stealing, like the rule that
82 See generally ERWqN SCHRODINGER, WHAT is LIFE? & MIND AND MATrER (1967)
(discussing possible physical explanations for life). See also WICKEN, supra note 46, at 53-
94 (describing the potential effects of thermodynamic forces on evolutionary develop-
ments); BROOKS & WILEY, supra note 46, at 24-75 (describing relationship between biolog-
ical and thermodynamic evolution); ENTROPY, INFORMATION, AND EVOLUTION, supra note
46.
83 There are two answers to any objection based on the distinction that one process
is animate while -the other is inanimate.
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the sun ought to rise, is a product of all the physical forces which
interacted to produce the particular rule. Absent free will, "Gret
ought not steal" is an expression which can be derived directly
from the rules of physical conduct, expressed as a physical rule of
survival which enhances social cooperation.84 Absent free will,
Gret is operating under a quasi-normative rule. No elements of
free will need be involved. If so, quasi-normative rules are descrip-
tive rules. Under such circumstances there is an is/ought relation-
ship, not an is/ought distinction. The is/ought distinction is inval-
id to the extent of the relationship.
If we now add the ability to make free willed decisions, then
Sentence 2 takes on the second connotation of the word "ought"
(making decisions). Incorporating this connotation into Sentence
2, I get:
Sentence 2a Gret ought to make a decision not to steal, be-
cause of practical reasons A, B and C which are
unrelated to moral worth; Gret has the ability to
make free willed decisions; it follows that Gret
will probably decide not to steal.
The situation in Sentence 2a exists because we have added the
element of free will. The conclusion, however, does not follow.
The conclusion cannot follow because practical reasons don't
make decisions, Gret does. Gret does so as a function of free will.
We must hope that the practical reasons A, B and C are incorpo-
First, the forces which form and reform atoms and molecules in the Earth's atmo-
sphere are the same forces which form and reform atoms and molecules in a living sys-
tem. even though the ostensible effects are quite different. It is not surprising that ought
statements related to living organisms look different than ought statements related to the
weather. The ought statements related to the weather look different from those related
to volcanos. And the ought statements related to macroscopic behavior of social animals
look different from those related to cardiovascular systems.
Second. the fact that the probabilities vary does not mean there is a difference in
the underlying nature of those probabilities. If I say that under prevailing conditions it
will to rain, my inference may be valid, but what are my odds of a successful prediction?
So instead I say, as a general rule, under these conditions it ought to rain. But that's
exactly the same as saying, as a general rule, under these conditions, Gret ought not
steal. Give me more facts and I'll improve the specific formulation of both ought state-
ments.
84 The fact that not every species develops the same set of survival rules does not
mean the process is not physical. It means we don't know enough about how brains and
rules develop. See Figure 6 supra Part II.B.
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rated into Gret's thinking and influence Gret to decide not to
steal. A correct description of the situation appears to be:
Sentence 2b Gret ought to make -a decision not to steal, be-
cause of practical reasons A, B and C which are
unrelated to moral worth; Gret has the ability to
make free willed decisions; if Gret is persuaded by
practical reasons A, B, C, or any other consider-
ations, then Gret may decide not to steal.
A descriptive or quasi-normative rule has been transformed
into the first version of a normative rule (influencing conformity
of conduct through decisionmaking) by the process of adding free
will. We now verbalize a rule we previously operated under
through instinct and training. Free will, however, has freed Gret
from having to follow the physical rules encoded in Gret's brain. I
observe that the rules themselves have not changed.
Freeing Gret has advantages relative to survival. Not every rule
encoded in Gret's brain enhances survival. Other rules may have
become obsolete as conditions changed. Or perhaps a rule gener-
ally enhances survival, but will not do so in a given situation. Or
perhaps a rule enhances survival, but a revised rule will further
improve the odds. Gret can choose whether to affirm the physical
rules Gret perceives, attempt to improve on those rules, or not
follow them at all. This process is rational. An organism that acts
rationally in light of objectives would appear to have advantages
over an organism which is restricted to acting on instincts and
trained responses.
Freeing Gret may also have disadvantages relative to survival.
Gret can change or adopt rules based on considerations unrelated
to survival, or endorse physical urges which may support survival
in some circumstances but which do not do so in the given situa-
tion. Or the reasoning employed in ostensibly pursuing survival
objectives may be faulty. Unchecked aggression, whether in a bar-
room or between nations, is potentially an example. Such deci-
sions may lead to a failure to survive.
The word "ought" in Sentence 2b now connotes a need to
make a decision or to influence a decision, because Gret is now
free to make any decision Gret wants to make about rules. The
because clause calls either for practical reasons which support a
rule in light of an objective (in the event Gret decides to make ra-
tional decisions) or for other considerations which will influence
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Gret (in the event Gret makes decisions based on such influenc-
es). Before free will, the because clause called for the factual basis
to sustain the probability assessments that Gret would follow a
particular rule.
One consequence of the development of free will is that I can
no longer analyze the physical probabilities related to an individu-
al organism in the same way. I must now know facts about how
Gret personally makes decisions if I am to make any viable infer-
ences about how Gret will act. The physical situation is described
by the following:
Sentence 2c Gret has the ability to make decisions, and be-
cause we know D, E and F about Gret, it follows
that Gret will probably decide not to steal.
This situation looks similar in form to the situations in Sentences
1 and 2. But is it? Can I make viable inferences about Gret's de-
cisions if I know enough facts about Gret's free willed
decisionmaking processes? Absent free will, facts D, E and F about
Gret were not needed. Instead, general facts X, Y and Z about the
physical processes involved in developing instincts and trained
responses were needed, as in Sentence 2. Such facts reflect condi-
tions in the physical world, given the objective of survival. Such
facts allow me to make predictions about the behavior of organ-
isms that follow quasi-normative rules.
Free will, by definition, is not constrained by objective forces.
If it is not constrained by objectives forces, then free willed deci-
sions might be indeterminate. If free willed decisions are indeter-
minate, then a discontinuity has appeared in the system. There
may not be any physical probability distributions associated with
the process of free will upon which to base viable inferences about
human decisions, whether related to survival or any other objec-
tive. Accordingly, the is/ought distinction may apply to inferences
about how Gret will make a free willed decision. Under the as-
sumption of free will, I cannot rely on the probability assessment
implied in Sentence 2c.
This is a problem. If my survival depends in part on the deci-
sions and actions of others, it would be helpful to know what
influences their decisions. Does free will have a need to survive?
Are there factors which routinely influence a free willed decision?
In this regard, I observe that Sentence 2c is not useless. The
sentence still applies, for example, to the situation where an actor
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has the ability to decide, but free will is either not in operation or
does not interfere with routine "physical decisions." Free will may
be suspended or overpowered by the force of passions, emotions,
instincts or trained responses, by the introduction of chemicals,
and perhaps by volition. Even when not overpowered by instinctu-
al responses, humans often act voluntarily in accordance with their
instincts and training. Character traits develop which include rou-
tine patterns for responding to situations, including situations
which call for decisionmaking. These routine patterns may-become
reinforced by habit.
One of our traits or habits is to follow the advice of authority.
Following the advice of authority can become a trained response.
If we know someone follows a particular authority, we may be able
to anticipate their decisions. Another one of our traits or habits is
to think things through rationally in accordance with our objec-
tives and values. Humans act rationally in accordance with objec-
tives because humans are rational. If we know what someone's
objectives are, and have some sense of their values, we may be
able to anticipate their decisions by thinking through the logical
consequences of such objectives and values. Humans also act emo-
tionally. Humans act emotionally because they are emotional. If we
know someone is likely to act emotionally, we will take that into
account. Humans can be classified according to their. behaviorial
patterns even though these patterns may be changed through acts
of free will.
In these various cases, facts about a person's traits or mental
routines become physical variables which can be used to make
educated guesses, if not viable inferences, about the outcome of
that person's decisionmaking process.' We guess at what other
people will decide to do and then act on those guesses. We act as
if there is a valid distinction within humans between a physically
driven decision, as with wolf packs and other social animals, and a
free willed decision. If there is, then Sentence 2c has utility. If so,
then an is/ought relationship still exists relative to some decisions,
despite the existence of free will. The factual basis for this rela-
tionship is the set of physical factors 'which describe a particular
person's character traits.
85 An educated guess does not rise to the level of viable inference unless there is a
determinable probability distribution associated with the event.
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Regardless of how a given person acts, an is/ought relation-
ship still exists relative to the physical factors which support surviv-
al. I cannot create just any set of rules and survive. The factual
basis for these ought statements may vary with the physical condi-
tions which confront me, but the physical rules of survival attach
to these conditions, not to my mind. Some derivation of these
rules becomes incorporated into my mind through instinct, train-
ing, rational thought or otherwise. These derivations are expres-
sions of the physical rules of survival, like "red" is an expression of
the wavelengths of light which strike my eye. Some of our deriva-
tions may be in error. The advantage of rational thought is that it
can distinguish between derivations and can identify the physical
variables which determine the rules. Through thought experiments
and physical tests, rational analysis can, in theory, improve on the
accuracy of the ought statements we derive from the physical con-
ditions which determine survival.
The fact that free will is one of the variables, and perhaps an
indeterminate one, does not alter my conclusion, it alters 'my
strategy. The indeterminancy of free will becomes a physical fact
which must be taken into account in deriving the rules of survival.
I must take into account the potential for indiscriminate behavior
and make efforts to influence decisions in favor of survival. As
long as humans physically interact with each other and the sur-
rounding environment, there will be physical rules which deter-
mine whether those interactions support or disparage survival.
The strategy in the previous paragraph has a defensive cast. It
may be that free will, whether physical or non-physical is some-
thing which enhances the prospects of human survival. Speculat-
ing, it is possible that free will developed gradually and physically.
The development of free will may have depended on the prior or
concurrent development of other processes of the brain, such as
rationality, consciousness, moral evaluation and early forms of
religious expression. These processes may all be physical. Con-
sciousness would have made humans aware of themselves as indi-
viduals, separate from the pack, and rationality would have provid-
ed the tool for achieving self-conscious objectives. Rationality may
have emerged' from the process of intentionally experimenting
with and revising trained responses. Using their rational skills,
humans would have gradually learned how to distinguish alterna-
tive actions based on the likely consequences of those actions. 6
86 See supra text accompanying note 17.
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Some process in the brain would have had to develop to
make selections between alternatives. Selection points to criteria
for selection and to objectives. Through the proactive phase of the
linear cycle, humans would have learned not only that they could
choose between alternative actions in light of an objective, but
that they could change objectives as well. Early forms of moral
evaluation and religious expressions, cast perhaps in the form of
obligations to follow uniform rules, might have developed as a
balance to self-conscious objectives based on individual wants and
desires. Free will may have emerged as that part of the higher
level brain functions which somehow weighed and selected alterna-
tive actions and objectives. On balance, free willed decisionmaking
may enhance the prospects of human survival. The weighing pro-
cess may have a physical basis, tied to wants, for example, or it
may be indeterminate. To resolve that question, we need more
facts about how humans make free willed decisions.
Although Sentence 2b remains intact, until we have more
facts about free will, Sentence 2c reduces to:
Sentence 2d Gret has the ability to make free willed decisions,
and because we know G, H, and I about the
physical world, it follows that Gret will probably
make some kind of decision relative to stealing.
I can make this inference based on what I know about time and
events. Time and events happen to all. Gret will be faced with the
physical consequences of physical events. Physical reality confronts
Gret with the opportunity to make decisions. No decision has the
force of a decision, since not making a decision will produce phys-
ical consequences of its own.
The objective test for the decisions humans make remains essen-
tially the same: Decisions and responses that support or at least do
not detract from continued survival continue to exist. The corol-
lary test, that decisions and responses which enhance the odds of
survival will gradually be favored over time, may have changed. As
a physical rule of survival, the corollary test remains the same, but
it may apply to humans only in the negative: Decisions and re-
sponses which disparage the odds of survival will be disfavored
over time. The application of the positive version of the rule may
depend on whether free willed humans learn from their history.
This assumes that no decision is made that eliminates the entire
species first.
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The third connotation of the word "ought" involves the no-
tion of moral value. If I add an evaluative connotation to the
word "ought," the original sentence, "Gret ought not steal," ex-
pands to:
Sentence 3 Gret ought not steal, because it is wrong to steal.
The word "wrong" points to some kind of evaluative criteria relat-
ed to stealing or to people who steal. If Gret asks me why it is
wrong to steal, then I might say one of several things in response:
(i) It is wrong because of practical reasons A, B, and C, in which
case I am addressing the question under Sentence 2b as a rational
issue related to consequences, with the understanding that Gret
may be influenced by other considerations. (ii) It is wrong be-
cause not stealing refers to something called a moral fact." I will
support this statement with theories about moral facts. (iii) It is
wrong because it is wrong in the view of my social group or my
community. I will explain the basis for the particular view. (iv) It
is wrong because it is wrong in the view of my religious group. I
will likewise explain the basis for the particular view. (v) It is
wrong because it is morally wrong to me. I will then explain my
personal moral views.
In this essay, I am interested in explanations (i), (iii) and (v).
Explanation (i) has already been discussed, but will come back in
later. Explanations (ii) and (iv), and other explanations, may accu-
rately describe reality or an aspect of reality, but the specific bases
for their explanations are outside of the scope of this essay. The
relationship of moral statements to moral facts or to religion will
be discussed in general terms only.
In looking at the grounds for finding something morally
wrong under explanation (iii) related to social groups or the sur-
rotinding community and under explanation (v) related to individ-
ual moral views, I suggest that Sentence 3 has the following com-
mon meaning:
Sentence 3a Gret ought not steal, because stealing has associ-
ated with it a negative moral value or moral worth.
87 See generally Moore, supra note 2: Michael S. Moore. Law as a Functional Kind, in
NATURAL LkW THEORY 188 (Robert P. George ed.. 1992); BRINK, supra note 2. Contrast
Jeremy Waldron, The Irrelevance of Moral Objectivity, in NATURAL LAW THEORY 158 (Robert
P. George ed., 1992).
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I observe that the sentence involves no decision by Gret and has
no conclusion about whether Gret will or will not steal. If it did,
then the moral value at stake becomes either a practical reason or
one of the other considerations why Gret's decision ought to be
influenced, and the situation reverts to Sentence 2b. Moral values
become something which guide or influence Gret's decisions.
Sentence 3a, however, can stand alone as a statement about
the type of value that is in something or connected to it, indepen-
d6nt from what particular actors choose to do about it. Volition of
an actor does not have to enter into the picture, unless the voli-
tion of the one who makes the evaluation determines what the
value is. This raises the question of what we mean by "value" and
by "moral value." Descriptive or quasi-normative rules were trans-
formed into the first version of modern normative rules by the
addition of free will. The transformation changed the connotation
of ought from physical outcomes to free willed decisions about
outcomes. The rule remained the same, but the transformation
now requires that Gret be freely persuaded about physical out-
comes. The use of the ought statement changed, and the factors
which plug into the because clause changed. Sentence 3a appears
to be another transformation, but of what sort?
The answer rests on what "value" and "moral value" are and
where they are located. By disassociating the word "value" from
the word "moral," I see that it's possible that the location of value
and the location of moral value may be different, even if the
concepts are related to each other. Earlier I identified one of our
common conclusions: that moral worth is a subjective attribute of
the human mind somehow generated by the human will.' If that
conclusion is correct, then moral value is a subjective thing locat-
ed in the human mind. But is moral value, like hardness or the
color of red a reflection of some external thing;' If "value," absent
the word "moral," can be said to be found in the relationship
between objects, and therefore an expression of physical circum-
stances and physical forces, then "moral value" might be a reflec-
tion of that value and those circumstances and forces, like "red" is
a reflection of the wavelengths of light emitted from a physical
object, and "hardness" is a reflection of density and rigidity.
88 See supra text following note 68.
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This is the four variable system I referred to earlier."9 Actual
red is to perceived red, as actual value is to perceived value. Intu-
itively the analogy does not seem to hold up if by "perceived val-
ue" we mean "moral value." We seem to generally concur as to
what red means, but we do not generally concur as to what has
moral value. Moral evaluation seems to be a process generated or
engaged in by a subjective will relative to a set of criteria for cor-
rectness which can be independent of external objects, rather than
a perception of a physical attribute. But if some moral evaluation is
a reflection of physical reality, then there has to be some thing to
evaluate.90
If some moral values are transformations of physical oughts,
then the following six variable system emerges:
(1) real attribute -> perceived attribute
(2) actual value > perceived value
I
-X
(3) internal criteria -> moral value
Figure 7
This expression is similar to the three relationships described
in Figure 6, expect listed in the reverse order.9 The notion rep-
resented by Figures 6 and 7 is that there is an actual value to
physical things which can be perceived, and that the perception of
this actual value can be transformed by the subroutines of X into
a moral value based on some criteria which explains the transfor-
mation. If the criteria are physically determined, then the transfor-
mation would be predictable. If the criteria are not physically de-
termined, then the transformation may be indeterminate.
89 See supra text following note 68.
90 See generally Moore, supra note 2; BRINK. supra note 2.
.91 See Figure 6 supra Part II.B.
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If there are actual values in things which can be perceived
without being processed by the brain through subjective criteria,
then a new situation exists:
Sentence 3b Not stealing ought to be a value in physical
system A, because the system does X, and not
stealing does Y to support X.
This statement about values is free of moral connotations and
moral actors. It relates values to consequences and to objectives.92
It relates logically to Sentence 1, the sun ought to rise, not to
Sentence 3a, it is morally wrong to steal.
Perceiving -what the values are, like perceiving how the sun
works, is a rational process. But in comparing Sentence 3b to
Sentence 1, the word "value" sounds peculiar. We do not usually
associate value with physical forces, like gravity. Setting aside that
concern for the moment, I can see that Sentence 3b, which
sounds objective, can be transformed into Sentence 3a, which
sounds subjective, by the operation of a subjective will which can
freely evaluate things, as in Figure 7. By definition, a free willed
subject can switch the word "negative" in Sentence 3a to the word
"positive" by a simple act of will, in which case the "ought not"
switches to *an "ought." Theoretically, there does not have to be
any grounds or criteria for the switch. But to help anchor the
discussion, I will say that such a switch is grounded in the-free
willed subject's own best lights or its internal criteria, whatever
they may be. These can include unusual community or group
93values and out of the ordinary religious convictions. 0
Making the switch may not be illogical as far as the particular
free willed subject is concerned. I'm a free willed subject. Assume
arguendo that not stealing supports survival. Assume that I'm
trying not to survive. Under these circumstances, 'tealing logically
becomes a positive rather than negative value in my system. Al-
though the converse of a valid logical statement is not alway valid,
it appears that if I steal in the right places, my odds of survival
will go way down.94
92 See Joseph Raz's arguments against forms of consequentialism. JOSEPH RAZ, THE
MORALITY OF FREEDOM 267-87 (1986).
93 Compare this process to the Branch Davidians or the Jonestown deaths.
94 Compare what happened to the Branch Davidians as a function of what a
neighboring group is likely to do in response.
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If my objective to not survive is physical and not a function of
free will, then I'm functioning under Sentence 3b. The physical
objective, X, is to not survive. Stealing should be a positive value
in the system, because stealing supports X. In such a case, there is
an is/ought relationship as to all aspects of the system, including
the likelihood that the system will not survive. If someone analyzes
me and determines that free will is not involved (or has been
overpowered), then they will look for physical reasons why I do
not follow the general rule of life forms, which is to survive. They
might look for a drug habit, physical depression, or some other
explanation why I do not physically fit the general rule.
If I switch objectives as an act of free will, then I'm function-
ing under Sentence 3a. Stealing has become a positive moral value
in my system of morality. Not surviving has become a conscious
objective. Here the is/ought distinction may apply to the decision
to switch objectives, but not to the subordinate values which sup-
port this new objective, at least not to the extent that they are
logically deriven from physical consequences, given the new objec-
tive. If someone analyzes me and determines that my decision to
not survive is based on a free willed choice, then they will look for
the non-physical criteria by which I made this choice. They might
declare that I have placed myself in an irrational state by deciding
not to survive. This claim is valid, however, only if it is rational to
survive.
If freely selected criteria are used to establish positive or nega-
tive moral values relative to stealing, then a descriptive rule, Sen-
tence 3b, or a quasi-normative rule, Sentence 2, has been trans-
formed into the second version of a moral evaluation normative
rule, Sentence 3a, by the process of adding free will to a system
which is otherwise described by physical ought statements. It is not
necessary for the fundamental objective of survival to change for
this transformation process to operate. I can freely affirm the
objective of survival and then freely evaluate any of the other
physical oughts in the system. I do not have to be consistent. I
can come to any conclusion or mix of conclusions I wish. It ap-
pears that I can arrive at moral value statements in at least three
ways (Figure 7): (i) I can perceive the actual value of a physical
ought relative to survival and then assign a moral value to it, (ii) I
can idealize the physical ought statement without perceiving its
actual value relative to survival, and simply declare that that ought
statement represents a moral value in my system, or (iii) I can
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add new ought statements that are not dependent on physical
oughts.
I suggest that some combination of (i) and (ii) may explain
the initial transformation of quasi-normative and pre-modern nor-
mative rules into early forms of modem systems of morality.95
The process of idealizing a physical ought statement (by truncat-
ing the physical grounds) has the advantage of encouraging or
reinforcing behavior which supports survival without the individual
needing to know why that behavior supports survival. It has the
disadvantage of rigidifying the system into a set of specific rules
'the enforcement of which may become an end in itself. If this
occurs, the adherent to the moral system may never see the physi-
cal objective to which the rule or the system is directed.
Perceiving actual values has the advantages of correcting er-
rors generated by idealizing physical ought statements. As was the
case with rational analysis of rules, not'all physical ought state-
ments support survival. Intuitively perceiving actual values and
assigning a corresponding moral value to the actual value would
encourage behavior that enhances the prospects of survival in
accordance with the actual value of that behavior. Under such cir-
cumstances, moral values serve as a substitute for the practical
reasons in Sentence 2b.
Humans, however, can adjust moral values for subjective pur-
poses, whether intentionally or unintentionally. Adjustments Might
have entered in through early forms of moral, religious and secu-
lar training in service to the desires, wants and needs of leaders:9
Perceptions and experiences would have varied. Cultural practices
would have developed and diverged. Some of this divergence
might have been random. As adherents followed the adjustments
made by their leaders, and made adjustments of their own, behav-
ior patterns would have continued to change. Some of these ad-
justments would have supported survival, while others would have
disparaged it.
I further suggest that some combination of (i), (ii) and (iii)
may explain the subsequent development of modern systems of
morality. At some point in history, humans discovered that objec-
tives and values could be freely changed. Once this point was
reached, philosophies and morality systems could develop which.
95 See generally PRIBRAM, supra note 2.
96 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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were not connected to rational analysis of physical events. 7 The
tools for in-depth historical or scientific analysis of physical events
did not develop until much later in history. Ideas which develop
may be physical and may carry a force of their own. On the other
hand, the process may be indeterminate. Either way, the human
brain reached a point where it could disassociate ought statements
from any physical grounds.
E. Defining Objective and Subjective Morality98
In this section, I define objective and subjective morality.
A specific effect of the subroutines of X surfaces in the vari-
ability of our value structures and our objectives. At the beginning
of a decision, whether related to an external event or involving
only internal contemplation, we have memory traces of the last
ordering of our values and objectives. During the decision we can
change our values and objectives, by adding to or overwriting the
old ones. In theory, we can do this without any physical or ratio-
nal grounds. We may be influenced to make changes for any num-
ber of reasons. Both external and internal events will influence
our decisions. These influences may include such things as ratio-
nal thought, moral evaluation, moral discourse, artistic expressions,
religious feelings and experiences, instincts, trained responses, and
the physical pressure of internal desires, wants and needs. We can
hold multiple sets of objectives, rules and values in our mind
which may be consistent or inconsistent with each other, and con-
sistent or inconsistent with the physical rules of survival.
97 I do not intend to imply that this means those philosophies and moralities are in
error, only that they do not depend on rational analysis of physical events.
98 Various decisionmaking models and analytical tools have been discussed or pro-
posed relative to legal decisions. It is useful to list some of them here for comparative
purposes. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978); POSNER, supra
note 25; Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE LJ. 453 (1989);
Jules L. Coleman, Rules and Social Facts, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 703 (1991); Jules L.
Coleman, Negative and Positive Positivism, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1982); Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theoy of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189
(1987); Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982); Michael
S. Moore, Three Concepts of Rules, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 771 (1991); Michael S.
Moore. A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277 (1985); Gerald J.
Postema, Coordination and Convention at the Foundations of Law, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 165
(1982); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175
(1989); Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 645
(1991); Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE LJ.
1 (1984); Sunstein, supra note 28; Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space:
What Lawyers Can Learn from Modern Physics. 103 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1989).
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Modifying Figure 5 from the introduction," I can depict this
situation as follows:








==> ext. events ==> meaning ==> action ==> ext. events ==>
Figure 8
The subscript n indicates that any number of sets of objectives,
rules and values can be generated by X. The subscript 1 identifies
the physical rules and values related to objective, survival. "Influ-
ences" equals the practical reasons and other considerations for
changing objectives, rules and values, as described above, and as
referenced in Sentence 2b, reprinted here for convenience:
Sentence 2b Gret ought to make a decision not to steal, be-
cause of practical reasons A, B and C which are
unrelated to moral worth; Gret has the ability to
make free willed decisions; if Gret is persuaded by
practical reasons A, B, C, or any other consider-
ations, then Gret may decide not to steal.
Assume that I think that not stealing enhances the odds that
the human species will survive and that I favor that objective. I
would like it, therefore, if Gret decided not to steal. Since Gret
has free will, I am faced with the need to influence Gret's deci-
sion through persuasion. Gaining free will altered the is/ought
relationship, but it did not destroy it. I did not lose the underly-
ing physical basis for not stealing. Instead I have gained the ability
99 See supra text accompanying note 17.
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to rationally understand it and perhaps improve on it. Therefore I
have not lost the objective ground for helping Gret decide wheth-
er to steal. As a matter of logic, I do not need to bring in ques-
tions of moral worth. Instead I need to demonstrate that the rule
against stealing derives from and supports the objective end of
survival, as in Sentence 3b:
Sentence 3b Not stealing ought to be a value in physical
system A, because the system does X, and not
stealing does Y to support X.
The demonstration becomes the practical reason for Sentence
2b. If Gret does not have free will, there is no reason to make any
logical demonstrations.' °° On the other hand, because Gret has
free will, I don't know how Gret will respond to my demonstra-
tion. Other considerations besides my logical argument may enter
into the picture. Those considerations are likely to involve other
practical reasons, as well as Gret's value structure. Value structures
are changeable and usually tied to notions of morality. If we get
into a debate about moral values, I feel I'm lost. Moral arguments
are known to be hard to win, unless Gret and I have a common
ground from which to start. But if Gret judges my logical argu-
ment from the point of view of an unexpressed value, I can lose
my argument anyway, never having debated the real issue. I con-
tend that debating values is the real issue because Gret and I can
make two logically consistent but contradictory arguments, given
the structure and ordering of our values. Gret and I may reach
logically defendable but contradictory conclusions.'
Rationality is an analytic tool. It can be placed in the service
of any values, any objective, and any set of rules. The outcome of
a rational argument depends on the values employed in the argu-
ment. There is no point in debating Gret's logic until there is at
least a reasonable concurrence in our values and in the objective
to which our argument is directed. In other words, Gret and I
have to have reasonably similar starting points, regardless of
whether we believe values to be subjective or objective.
The distinction between subjective and objective values makes
a difference. If it is believed that values trace only to subjective
100 Gret may be a young child or otherwise incapable of entertaining logical argu-
ment. My alternatives are to assist Gret develop such capabilities, train, or incarcerate.
101 See my "not surviing" argument supra text accompanying note 94.
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preference and subjective criteria, then some form of achieving
concurrence in starting points besides rational argument will have
to be used. The initial or threshhold arguments would need to be
persuasive efforts designed to shift somebody's values. Hume's
is/ought distinction would apply to all values. If it is believed that
some values can be traced to a physical reality, then rational argu-
ment can be used to show that, connection and that reality. The
initial issue before the parties would be whether the values in the
argument have been rationalized to physical reality. If this is the
situation, then the logic which purports to demonstrate which
values are objective can be analyzed. An is/ought relationship
would exist relative to some values.
I make my logical demonstration to Gret, and lose anyway.
Gret says that stealing a few purses and doing a little shoplifting is
not that big a deal. Gret's companions do it all the time and no
one is hardly ever caught, and only once was somebody injured.
It's just my personal opinion that not stealing ought to be impor-
tant to people. Worrying about survival of the species is not that
important either. The species will take care of itself. Besides, Gret
doesn't steal from friends, but only from strangers. Strangers
should look after themselves.
Gret seems to be making two points: (i) My notion that values
can be rationalized to physical reality yields only relative and sub-
jective opinions as to what those values are and how they should
be ordered. My process is in reality just another subjective morali-
ty. (ii) The central objective in my system is survival of the species.
The central objective in reality is individual or group survival,
rather than species' survival. Values, even if objective, will vary
from individual to individual, and from group to group, as is the
case now. Groups compete with each other. Such competition is
one of the physical rules of survival. If I put the real objective into
my system, there would not be a common value structure with
which to work.
The first point will be taken up now. It calls for a definition
of objective and subjective morality. The discussion of the first
point will be used to partially address the second point. The ques-.
tion of 'competition and common values will be more fully ad-
dressed in Part V.
As a control condition, assume that one of the objective ends
of the forces which shape human life is survival of the human
species. Assume also that the higher brain functions of humans
(the physical subroutines of X) are functioning as we currently
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know them except that we do not have the ability to make any free
willed decisions. Instead, assume that what we think of as subjec-
tive free will is in fact an objective physical process which on bal-
ance makes decisions which enhance the prospects of human sur-
vival. Although any given decision might be indeterminate (like
the events in subatomic space), nevertheless across a large number
of events the outcomes are predictable in that they generally sup-
port survival. In other words, the probability distribution associated
with "physical decisionmaking" favors survival of the species.
Events occur. Life goes on. The forces acting on and through
humans, operating in accordance with the rules which describe
how energy reacts to energy, including the forces which determine
decisions in this "physical will," churn out certain results.
Rules/values, gradually change to rules/values, in accordance with
Figure 8, but only under the influence of physical forces. The
objective stays the same. Call this hypothetical state of affairs the
"unaltered" process. It is not necessary to imagine what this state
of affairs would actually be like, because the real state of affairs I
am analyzing includes free will.
Having set up the imaginary "unaltered" process for control
purposes, I can now analyze what happens when individuals have
free will. The initial objective of the system, objective,, is still as-
sumed to be survival of the species.
Because -I have free will, I have the opportunity for subjective
decisionmaking. I can make one of two types of decisions. I can
freely select an alternate end of my own choosing in place of
objective1, reducing objective, to a lower status or eliminating it,
or I can accept objective , as my primary end. The first type of
decision institutes and actualizes a subjective end. The second type
of decision affirms the objective end and attempts to actualize it.
When I institute an alternate subjective end, I actualize my
value structure in accordance with how I think things ought to be.
My subjective end and its supporting values may be grounded in
my own inclinations, or I may have been influenced to adopt the
views of others. I might choose, for example, to place individual
short-term goals ahead of species survival. An is/ought relationship
exists between my value structure and whatever it is that motivates
or generates that value structure. An is/ought distinction may exist
between my values and physical reality. If I formulate my value
structure into a set of rules, I have created a subjective morality
which will have objective consequences on the surrounding physi-
cal world.
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When I affirm objective, (species survival), I have two ways to
attempt to actualize it. One way is to try to forecast the results of
the "unaltered" process and then try to do those things. Since I
don't have any way of knowing with certainty what the unaltered
process would produce, this approach will most likely introduce a
reordering of future events despite my best efforts. The second
way is to try to improve on the success or efficiency of the unal-
tered process. Since I still don't know What the unaltered process
would produce, I have no way of knowing if I've succeeded. Un-
der either apprbach, I will actualize some set of values I think
support species survival.
Both decisions (instituting subjective ends or affirming the
objective end) are, by definition, subjective. They are subjective by
definition because both types of decisions require a commitment
by free will. Free will has to be motivated to commit. Either deci-
sion will produce objective consequences and, like the addition a
single protozoan, will alter the configuration of the" universe. The
second type of decision has the added problem that other subjec-
tive values, unrelated to species survival, may come into play de-
spite my best efforts. These values may enter into my
decisionmaking process, as expressed or unexpressed values, and
alter intended outcomes. Even if no subjective values come in,
there may be several solutions to a problem, each of which sup-
ports survival. A choice will have to be made from among these
alternative solutions. Such choices will produce different sets of
consequences for real people, even though the net effect of each
is to support species survival. Different people may not survive as a
result of one choice or the other.
There is a distinction, however, between the two types of deci-
sions. The distinction lies in the criteria used to make the decision.
Both decisions are subjective, but the character of the criteria is
different. Changing the factors which go into any decision changes
the stream of physical consequences which flow from the decision.
A decision to actualize a subjective end will either look to the
future consequences which support that end, or, if the decision is
based on a set of absolute rules or values, then the decision *will
look to an analysis of which rule to apply. A decision to support
species survival looks to future consequences relative to survival of
the species as the criteria for the decision. Survival of the species
includes survival of succeeding generations.
Observe how the nature of my problem in influencing Gret's
decision changes if Gret, for whatever reason, (i) decides as a
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general matter that the human species ought to survive, (ii) places
as. a fundamental value in Gret's personal value structure any no-
tion of human survival which includes both the physical health
(reconstitution) of a specific group of individuals and the contin-
ued existence of generations of individuals in that group beyond
the current generation (propagation), and (iii) decides to actual-
ize the objective and the fundamental value with the aid of ratio-
nal thought."2 By fundamental value, I mean that human surviv-
al (in the form of either small or large groups, as Gret chooses) is
given a status sufficient to assure that it is considered during
Gret's free willed decisionmaking process. Realistically, survival of
Gret's group will not be the only value Gret has.
Once given some form of group survival, including propaga-
tion, as one of the fundamental values in Gret's value structure
(valuen in Figure 8), the physical process of rationality will be
energized in service to that value and its underlying objective.
Rationality relates things as they are or have been to how they
ought to be in the future in light of selected objectives and values.
Rationality will then produce one or more "suggested" solutions
based on the consequences of alternative actions relative to the
value and objective which Gret has selected. An is/ought relation-
ship exists as to this part of the process because the solutions
generated are descriptions of the physical probabilities associated
with the alternatives.
These are rational oughts which represent Gret's best percep-
tions of the physical rules of survival, as in Sentence 2b.'° They
include adjustments to the physical rules encoded in Gret's brain,
since not all such rules enhance survival. Gret's inference takes
the form, "humans in the selected group, including humans not
yet born, ought to survive if I decide to do A, B, or C; they are
most likely to survive if I do B." The nature of the problem has
changed, because at this point in Gret's decisionmaking process
Gret and I have a debatable, but objective, issue as to the actual
probabilities associated with the consequences of Gret's alternative
solutions. This will include debating with Gret what other groups
will do in response to Gret's alternative solutions. It will also in-
clude debating the probable effects relative to survival of things
like destruction of the Earth's rain forests, as in Thought Experi-
102 The problem of gaining this degree of initial concurrence will be discussed infra
Part V.
103 See supra text following note 84.
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ment #3, and depletion of the ozone layer. Gret's group cannot
survive if some other group takes an action which eliminates
Gret's group. These debates may alter my outlook or Gret's out-
look. What we learn depends on how we focus on things and on
what we choose to study.
Gret's suggested solutions, with any adjustments, will then be
factored into the balancing or weighing process as part of the rest
of Gret's decision. The is/ought distinction may apply to the rest
of the decision, depending on whether the other values are ratio-
nalized to physical reality. The higher the value placed on human
survival, the more likely one of Gret's survival solutions will be
actualized.
Subject to the physical limitations of rational thought, this
process will enhance the chances that Gret's group will survive.
How many groups survive depends on what all groups do in rela-
tion to all other groups, what mix of rules and values are followed
by those groups, what the physical rules of survival tell us about
group interaction (the objective test), and what rational analysis
determines enhances the odds of survival in light of the objective
test and the current mix of rules and values.
I have two observations. First, I agree with Gret that the initial
step in this process is relative and subjective. The fundamental
value in the system is survival of the species in the form of indi-
vidual groups."4 Free will must commit, consciously or subcon-
sciously. Unexpressed values may enter the picture and distort ob-
jectivity. I do not, however, agree that this is just another subjec-
tive morality. Once free will commits to the initial objective, value,
and mode of analysis, decisions will be made based on physical
assessments related to those factors which support survival over the
long run, 5 with conscious awareness of the objective test ex-
pressed in the physical rules of survival. Decisions which support
survival or do not detract from it are accepted. Decisions which
disparage survival are disfavored. Any of Gret's alternative solu-
tions, within the limits of rationality, will permit Gret's group to
survive, unless some outside factor overwhelms it. That outside
factor may be an unforeseeable physical calamity or the action of
another group. The process appears to be neutral as-to the philo-
sophical, moral and religious beliefs of individual groups.'
104 I will explore the consequences of this infra Part V.C. In the meantime, it seems
to be a realistic statement of human behavior.
105 Factors which support survival will be considered infra Part V.B.
106 The problem of selecting betveen multiple solutions will be considered infra Part
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Second, the outcome of this process appears to match the
outcome of the hypothetical control condition I set up. In the
hypothetical I assumed that what we think of as free will is in
reality a physical process which on balance makes decisions which
enhance the prospects of our survival.'07 We achieve the same
general result, with perhaps a different ordering of events, when
we consciously or subconsciously elevate group survival to the
status of a fundamental value to be considered when we make any
decision. In either case rationality becomes a physical check on
the other considerations which influence our decisions."8 In the
hypothetical case, the subjective disappears. In the real world case,
as far as we know it to be the real world case, the subjective has
to adopt the objective.
Herein lies the basis for my claim that there can be such a
thing as an objective morality. It consists of a physically based set
of rules of human conduct, and their associated values, which
derive from and support the objective of physical survival. Those
rules describe processes which are intrinsic to the nature of the
physical world, observable by humans, relevant to human conduct,
and not mere products of human imagination."°
As descriptions of physical processes, these rules are like other
descriptive rules which describe the general forces operating in
the universe. They describe the forces operating on human life,
either to sustain it or to defeat it. There are two types of rules
within the overall set of such rules. The first are "ought" and
"ought not" statements which we developed over the years during
reactive phases of the linear cycle of human life. We perceive
these rules, project their effects into the future and modify them
by rational analysis. We ought not steal because we might not
survive the act of stealing. We ought to bury acorns for the winter
because we might not survive the winter. Not every physical rule
we perceive is part of this morality, because not every rule we
perceive supports human survival. The second are "ought" and
V.C.
107 If this condition does not obtain, through the cumulative actions of either physi-
cal or free will, then existing physical probabilities would favor the extinction of humans.
108 For the general purposes of this essay, I take rationality to include the entire
process by which we make physical inferences based on the physical facts we observe in
objective reality. Under a broad definition this would include our notions of intuition
and insight, provided that such intuitions and insights are grounded by an is/ought rela-
tionship to physical events.
109 See supra Part I.C.
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"ought not" statements we develop during proactive phases
through experiments. These experiments can be hypothetical or
physical. Physical experiments can be scientific or historic. We
advance an action and see what happens. We study the actions
others took and analyze what happened. We learn from the reac-
tions what to do and not to do, and project the results into the
future. Soldiers, going somewhere, learn to break step when they
cross a bridge. We have learned that the harmonics we set in
motion can bring the bridge down.
These rules, like the rules of physics and thermodynamics, are
in and of themselves free of moral worth connotations, although
the central objective has to be accepted. The rules describe the
perimeter or boundary constraints which physical reality places on
human endeavors. The rules do not describe what to do within
those constraints, nor do they necessarily describe how to balance
every conflict which arises when more than one alternative action
supports survival. What the rules describe is how to avoid not
surviving. Resolving conflicts within the boundary constraints may
require moral worth considerations as to how benefits and bur-
dens of alternative survival solutions are to be distributed. Then
again, resolving such conflicts may yield to rational analysis based
on physical rules."' If moral worth considerations are required,
then the is/ought distinction may apply.
I can now define "objective morality based on survival" as a
morality which recognizes as its criteria for correct behavior physi-
cal rules of survival perceived by reason and projected into the
future by rational analysis. Although the rules involved are in and
of themselves free of moral worth connotations, I can describe
them as moral rules because they are incorporated as part of the
rule/value structure of a human. In contrast, I will define "sub-
jective morality" as a morality which recognizes among its criteria
for correct behavior the interests of a free willed subject either (i)
within the constraints of survival, or (ii) against those constraints.
What I've endeavored to show in this part of the essay is that
the physical rules of survival, some of which are encoded in our
brains and some of which have been transformed into normative
statements by acts of free will, can be perceived through reason
and ought to be adopted, if humans want to survive. I have not
yet shown how the. rules of survival resolve group interactions, and
110 See, e.g., RAWs. supra note 4 (reflective equilibrium).
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I have not yet shown whether there is an objective basis for decid-
ing whether the human species ought to survive.
V. DEVELOPING A THEORY OF VALUES
A. The Range of Outcomes Which Support Survival
At the conclusion of Part IV, I gave definitions for objective
and subjective moralities. As defined, an objective morality based
on survival functions as a constraint or check on subjective morali-
ties. Physical forces, including the physical forces which operate
within other life forms, are a limiting factor in what we can do.
Although we do not ordinarily associate the word "value" with
physical forces, assume for the moment that I will be able to show
the relevancy of such an association. With that proviso, I can de-
pict the relationship between the physical world and free will sche-
matically as in Figure 9 below.
The larger circle in the drawing represents all possible phys-
ical outcomes in which humans would survive. The smaller circle
represents the actual consequences of human value systems:
physical physical UNIVERSE





E: acts of human
will -> values ==> consequences ==> don't survive
Figure 9
Figure 9 is to be interpreted as -follows. Individuals make
choices by acts of will establishing or fulfilling human values and
generating actions which have consequences in the physical world.
Some of these choices lead to a failure to survive. People die.
Sometimes it is the people who establish the human values and
select the particular actions who die. The thief is shot during a
bank robbery. The rock climber falls to her death. At other times
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it is other people who fall victim to those choices. A pit bull at-
tacks a neighbor. A group of gunmen kidnap and later execute
their prisoners. Human history is full of such other times. Objec-
tive processes can be. used for subjective ends.
"Failure to survive" does not have to equate to physical death.
As a rational tool, the phrase can be used as a term of art encom-
passing anything which can said to be no longer surviving or
which has been placed in jeopardy of dying. Failing to survive can
be any outcome identified in a risk analysis where risks have been
shifted in favor of dying (against some rational norm). Things are
said to rise and fall-the stock market, the Roman Empire, the
fortunes of a family, and the prospects for a football franchise or
for the whale or spotted owl. Falling to survive may be viewed
more as a direction than a finality, as when I make the wrong
move in a chess game. The direction may or may not be revers-
ible, depending on the circumstances.
The human brain is equipped to foresee consequences. It can
take advantage of the consequences it likes, and forestall or coun-
teract the ones it does not like."' The brain does this by taking
into account and responding to the consequential effects of physi-
cal forces. Some processes can be set in motion the effects of
which cannot be averted. To enhance the odds of survival, and
perhaps in order to survive at all, the brain must incorporate into
its value structure the physical rules and values of an objective
morality based on survival and act on those values with foresight.
B. Physical Factors Which Support Survival
Before I get to Gret's second point, that individual and collec-
tive values related to physical survival will vary, I want to speculate
as to what those values might look like. Variables in a mathemati-
cal formula are placeholders for general concepts or kinds of
things. I'm interested here in the kinds2 of things which ac-
count for physical survival, whether viewed from the individual or
collective perspective. I will call a kind of thing a factor.
I suggest in Figure 10 below a general description of a species
survival system as a first approximation. The list or schematic is
one way of describing the physical factors which determine the
111 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
112 For a notion of functional kind, see Moore, Law as Functional Kind, supra note
87; Moore, A Natural Law Theoiy of Interpretation, supra note 98.
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survival of life forms and the relationships which exist between
these factors. In developing the schematic, I considered countries,
businesses, social groups, ethnic groups, families, individuals and
other life forms. I am looking for commonalities. The descriptions
which follow the list are important not for their details but for the
general notions about rules and values which they are intended to
convey.1 3
The schematic shows one objective, listed at the top, followed




STABILITY PRODUCTIVITY - INGENUITY
III
I I I
of Rule of Rule of Rule of
ver Law Plenty Technology
ocial structure resource management capacities
Offspring
Figure 10
The list is to be interpreted as follows. Physical survival is sup-
ported by three principal factors-stability, productivity and in-
genuity-to which values must be assigned. Life forms and organi-
113 See Sentence 3b supra text accompanying note 100.
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zations of life forms-which.are stable enough, productive enough,
and ingenius enough-survive."4
Stability implies all those subordinate factors or values which
go to assuring that a particular life form will continue to exist
tomorrow pretty much like it does today and that successive gener-
ations of the group with which that life form is associated will
continue to survive in some form in the future. Stability does not
mean rigidity. It means having a structure which can accomodate
change without disintegrating. Designing such a structure involves
some form of pre-decision risk analysis or post-decision verification
(such as trial and error). Rigidity in a bridge or building can lead
to its destruction. If a rigid structure encounters forces which ex-
ceed certain limits, it will break. In response, engineers have
learned to build flexibility into structures to accomodate such
forces through bending. Bridges and buildings are now designed
to move around a bit, something like a tree bending in the wind.
The tree learned this a long time ago.
Productivity implies all those subordinate values which go to
assuring that the life form produces the things which are needed
to support the objective. It is not necessary that the outputs of a
life form be continually expanding in number. The life form or
the organization of life forms can be in balance with its surround-
ings. This depends on what the surroundings are doing. If the
surroundings are undermining stability, then expanding outputs
may be one way to counteract this. If not, then oversupply may
endanger stability. If there is room to grow and resources to
accomodate the growth, then the most productive life forms will
tend to fill the void. Life forms tend to do this by instinct. Busi-
ness organizations have learned to plan, and perhaps limit, their
growth.
Ingenuity implies all those subordinate values which go to
assuring that the life form is equipped to be productive. and to
find and implement ways to enhance stability. If the surrounding
environment is not hostile, then swords are not needed. The sur-
rounding' environment is often hostile. Other organisms are not
always friendly, and they, and other physical forces like typhoons,
compete for available resources. Absent free will, life forms tend
114 These values and their associated rules are connected and interrelated. Things
which can be described under one could perhaps be described in whole or in part un-
der another. For Hart's commentary on minimum content of natural law, see HART,
supra note 1. at 189-95.
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to treat other life forms as if they were physical objects or physical
forces. Almost all life forms are in somebody else's food chain or
potentially threaten somebody else's growth or existence.
As long as that condition remains, then weapons and other
defensive tools are needed, like shelters from the storm. Animals
burrow in the ground and build edifices against the wind. One
approach is to not wait for problems to arise. Sharpened beaks
and axes can be used to tame the wilderness and provide places
for growth. Claws and swords can be used to eliminate other or-
ganisms which stand in the way or which are in control of re-
sources which are needed or wanted. All of these techniques must
stand the test of efficiency and effectiveness. Endeavoring to con-
quer one's neighbors can destabilize a system. If it does not, then
one species or group will crowd out another, perhaps to the
latter's destruction. Humans, unlike other organisms, can foresee
this state of affairs and take countermeasures in advance to main-
tain stability which supports survival.
As factors or values, stability, productivity and ingenuity are
described by four sets of descriptive rules: the Rules of Power,
Law," 5 Plenty, and Technology. These Rules represent the entire
set of physical rules, whether known, unknown or unknowable,
which regulate or describe how stability, productivity and ingenuity
can be physically achieved. They are expressions of how energy re-
acts to energy. Some combination of specific rules from among
these four is necessary to produce an organism that survives.
The Rule of Power says that a surviving organism has suffi-
cient power or energy to move forward in time and overcome
obstacles which defeat survival. The Rule of Law says that the
power or energy necessary to survive will often be channeled in
some way to avoid physical conflict. Avoiding physical conflict
115 I mean "Law" in a very broad sense to include social custom as well as other
voluntary and mandated practices supported by the use or threatened use of power. I do
not mean to imply a theory of law by this use of the word "Law". The phrase "Rule of
Custom," however, did not capture the full range of rules by which humans substitute
orderly behavior for direct confrontations of power. The phrase "Rule of Rules" also does
not work because it would not distinguish the confrontation use of power which also
follows rules. The phrase "Rule of Law" is intended to connote the non-confrontational
use of power, after the establishment of the custom, practice or legal rule, to achieve
objectives. Power, in the form of either raw physical power or voluntary consent, is tied
to the development and actualization of customs, social practices and positive law. The
lateral connection in Figure 11 is intended to connote that some customs, practices and
legal rules are the result of physical control (threats) while others are the result of the
voluntary use of individual power through the exercise of consent.
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appears to enhance stability. The Rule of Plenty says that a sur-
viving organism has tapped into sufficient resources to reconstitute
itself and produce external results (offspring). The Rule of Tech-
nology says that the manner in which it does all this determines
its success and efficiency. If the combination of rules work, then
physical outcomes under the organism's specific combination of
rules will place or maintain the organism in the intersecting por-
tion of the large and small circles in Figure 9, and will enhance
the odds that offspring remain in that circle..
Specific rules, shown on the next line of Figure 10, vary from
organism to organism, but each rule appears to fall within ,these
four general classifications or some combination of them. A rule
like "the squirrel ought to bury acorns for the winter" is primarily
a rule of plenty. It describes how the squirrel secures the resourc-
es needed to remain productive. The jaws and teeth of a shark
describe part of the shark's rule of technology. They make. a'for-
midable offensive and defensive weapon. They are used to support
productivity. An amoeboid protozoan's bifurcation process is pri-
marily a rule of plenty (resources are consumed and a product is
produced), although it also describes a technology. Both stability
and productivity depend on technology. The protozoan's cell struc-
ture, for example, is a rule of technology. It defines the bound-
aries of the protozoan and stabilizes the location of internal chem-
ical reactions. An organism that wants to eat the protozoan must
get through the cell wall before it can lunch freely.
The rules for non-free willed organisms vary because of ele-
ments of randomness and trial and error. Technologies change
through experimentation during the linear cycle of survival.
Things which don't work are eliminated. Technologies also change
as a result of DNA modifications and other adjustments to an
organism's biochemistry. Perhaps these modifications are feed-
backs. Perhaps they are random occurrences. Either way, things
which produce failures to survive are eliminated under the objec-
tive test contained in the physical rules of survival. "6
Things which do work diverge. Things which work take off
into the physical world in different directions and encounter dif-
ferent sets of physical circumstances. This process leads to further
modifications and further diversity in technological approaches
which satisfy the physical factors of survival." 7 The objective end
116 See supra text following note 79.
117 This would appea to satisfy the Second Law of Thermodynamics, which says that
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of this diversity in life forms seems to be to enhance the odds that
some type of life survives.
The requirement for stability plays out through the Rules of
Power and Law. We sometimes associate this process with a phrase
such as "survival of the fittest." We tend to equate that phrase with
a hierarchy of powerful individuals. The social structures of pri-
mates and other mammals are influenced by rules which powerful
leaders "decided" to adopt. Among non-free willed organisms, the
power structures which have developed under such influences
provide stability for the social group and usually a means for trans-
ferring leadership roles and resolving disputes without destruction
of the social group and without constant internal warfare. Internal
tensions exist, but the conflicts are usually not mortal ones. Over
the long run, groups with effective combinations of rules for deal-
ing with internal conflicts and external encounters with other
groups and other external forces will survive.
While I do not accept a phrase like "survival of the fittest,"
preferring instead a phrase like "effective combination of rules
produced through a variety of competitive and non-competitive
techniques,' '  I accept nonetheless the idea that rules of physi-
cal conduct developed over time through the interactions of indi-
vidual power sources. Power is constantly interacting with power.
Energy reacts to energy. Individual organisms are systems of ener-
gy. The rules that developed are a function of the possible ways
that energy can react to energy.
During exchanges between individuals, the wants, drives and
needs of one individual come into contact with the wants, drives,
the entropy of the physical world is always increasing. A common statement of the Sec-
ond Law is that the physical world tends to disorder. This is easily misunderstood. It
does not mean chaos. It means that things don't always happen the way we think they
are "intended" to. For our purposes, the Second Law says that if there are twelve ways
for things to happen (e.g., throwing a pair of dice) and nothing interferes in the process,
then all twelve ways will eventually be tried out through random selection or occurrence.
If we had six dice in a game and throw them all repeatedly, we would not expect all
sixes very often. But if the products which came out of all sixes were somehow more
stable and could gradually supersede the products which came out of all other throws.
then the world would eventually be all sixes. All sixes might represent life and its particu-
lar sets of combinations. See generally SCHRODINGER, supra note 82 (discussing a physical
theory of life); FEYNMAN, supra note 4; 44-1 to 44-10 (describing Second Law); BARROW,
supra note 39, at 182-210 (describing Second Law); WICKEN. supra note 46 (discussing
wave functions and probability distributions): BROOKS & WILEY. supra note 46. See also
STEPHEN H. KELLERT, IN THE WAKE OF CHAOS, UNPREDICTABLE ORDER IN DiNAMICAL S S-
TEMS (1993).
118 This is a phrase of my own choosing. See my comments supra note 80.
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and needs of another individual. These exchanges led over time
to rules about how power is distributed within social groups. These
rules may have been worked out initially through physical conflict.
Over time, however, rules also developed which allowed power to
flow and disputes to be resolved without physical conflict. Some
animals developed elaborate sparring or "sizing up" rituals. The
advantage of such rules is that neither contestant suffers a failure
to survive in the process, leaving both contestants in a position to
continue to support the collective needs of the social group or
pursue their individual objectives. Humans are an example. Under
such circumstances, the Rule of Law becomes a substitute for
physical conflict.
Other exchanges between members of a social group may
have led directly to rules supporting cooperative behavior without
involving an initial phase of physical conflict. As aggressive as
mammals tend to be, resolving physical conflicts does not seem to
explain all the rules related to courtship, mating, food supply,
hunting, migration, information exchange and the raising and
protection of offspring. Adaption and accomodation are means for
developing cooperative rules without physical conflict." 9 Satisfy-
ing mutual needs through consent appears to be a more likely
basis for some rules. Exercising consent- is one means of exercising
the power individuals possess. Under such circumstances, the Rule
of Law becomes an instrument for achieving objective ends.
But this description of the flow of power during exchanges is
still shortsighted. Every living organism which is surviving possesses
the power to survive within a context and the energy to overcome
obstacles within the limits of that energy. All individuals possess
power. They are an expression of the flow of energy. Organisms
may not always be aware of the extent of the power they physically
possess. Most organisms do not have the rational skills necessary to
learn how to manipulate their potential power.
If organisms or organizations of life forms possess power, and
become conscious of that fact, then they can use that power, singly
or in combination with others. A lone gunman can hold a large
group at bay. A small group can dump tea into the harbor. A
large group can march on a city. Changes in the recognized bal-
ance of power are likely to lead to changes in the rules by which
119 See generally MAYR, supra note 15.
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a social group is structured. When energy meets energy there is a
reaction. Adjustments take place.
The reaction does not have to lead to physical conflict. Ad-
justments can take place through accomodation, recognizing the
change in conditions by making a corresponding change in the
rules and values which support survival. When you bring a new
animal into a home which already has one, fur is. likely to fly for
awhile. Usually the two brains adjust to each other as new rules
are worked out. As long as the new rules work and the new bal-
ance of power remains intact, the new arrangement will survive.
An equilibrium has been reached.
If the new equilbrium is reached without destroying the social
structure in the process, then the social system was stable enough
to accomodate change. 2' If the conflict turns deadly, and the
new equilibrium is reached only after the old social system disin-
tegrates and a new one is created, then the system was not stable.
How stable the new system is depends on which combinations of
rules are selected from among those described by the Rules of
Power and Law. With free will, conscious selection of rules is pos-
sible.
In Figure 10, the rules on the line below the four Rules are
variable placeholders which represent the specific rules which
describe a species or a sub-group of that species: social structure,
resource management and capacities. For organisms without free
will, these specific rules developed physically over time during the
linear cycle of survival. For protozoans they are descriptive. For
wolf packs they are quasi-normative. For prehistoric humans they
are pre-modern normative rules. For modern humans the specific
rules have become normative.
My argument from Part IV is that at least some of these nor-
mative rules are transformations of physical oughts. Not stealing,
for example, is a physical ought which supports stability and pro-
ductivity. Stealing destabilizes the system. The value of not stealing
can be identified without discussion or involvement of the notion
of moral worth given the overall objective to survive. My argument
from Part IV is that humans have the ability to perceive which val-
ues support survival and which do not and then to adopt the ones
that do, with modifications made through proactive experimenta-
tion and contemplation to fit the circumstances. Such values are
120 See generally RAWLS, supra note 4.
[Vol. 69;4
COMMENT-SURVIVAL VALUES AND OBJECTIVE MORALITY
objective. They will take effect whether we respond to them or
not.
C. Relativity of Values; Constancy of Factors
In the previous two sections I have been exploring the notion
of "value" separated from the notion of "moral value." In this
section I develop the notion of objective values and objective fac-
tors into a general theory. I then respond to Gret's second point,
that individual and community values will vary. I endeavor to show
that a common value structure exists which supports species surviv-
al.
As to "value" and "moral value," the question is whether
something can have value outside of our interpretation of that
value. That is, can "value" exist outside our heads. As with the
word "ought," this depends on what we mean by "value." We say
things like "this diamond has value." The objection is that the
value of the diamond being signaled in the sentence is not objec-
tive, but subjective. The value of the diamond is in our heads.
According to the objection, what we mean is that "the diamond
has value to a diamond-cutter, or a customer" or "the diamond
has value to me as a remembrance of my grandmother or grandfa-
ther." The objection is that we have truncated the sentence, much
like we did with "ought" statements.
The general form of the completed sentence is "this thing has
value to that thing because of X, Y, or Z." One or both of the
things referenced in the sentence could be a human, but neither
has to be. For example, we can say that acorns have value to a
squirrel, or that a den has value to a wolf. On the other hand, we
do not ordinarily say that hydrogen has value to the sun. We usu-
ally say that hydrogen is used by the sun to produce light. But we
could say that hydrogen has value to sun, if we know what we
mean by the statement. For example: the objective end of the sun
as currently constituted is the production of light. Without hydro-
gen the objective end would be darkness. The process of produc-
ing light in the sun requires hydrogen. Hydrogen has value or
utility relative to the process of producing light.
Distinguishing between the sun and a squirrel is important
when we are trying to distinguish between what* an animated sys-
tem does that is different from an inanimate system. The distinc-
tion is not so important if we are trying to analyze how physical
processes work in general. Observations of how we ordinarily use
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language suggest that we generally use the word "value" to signify
the utility of something to a living process, usually humans. Food
has value to a protozoan or a wolf because it fuels the physical
process of surviving. But food to a life form is like hydrogen to
the sun. The fact that we typically reserve the word "value" to
describe an attribute of the human mind does not change what is
happening in a purely physical process. The squirrel is a physical
process with an objective end, to survive, like the sun is a physical
process with an objective end, to produce light. Gladys is, at least
in part, a collection of 10,000,000,000,000 (10 trillion) operating
cells.' Gladys, like the squirrel, has an objective end.
The notion of value so described is a relative thing. Value de-
scribes the relationship between two physical objects in light of a
process or objective end. The value or utility of something will
change depending on the objects and processes involved. This
does not mean that the value of something is indeterminate and
subjective. It means that value is a variable. Variables are
placeholders in mathematical formulas.
A simple formula is d = r x t (distance equals rate times
time). All three symbols are variables. We also call them factors in
a mathematical function. Distance is a function of two factors, rate
and time. We can't plug in any values we want, because the for-
mula describes a physical relationship. Once the values of two of
the factors are known, the value of the third factor is completely
fixed by the intrinsic relationship between these aspects of physical
reality. Moreover, the range of possible values for each factor is
limited, depending on the nature of the physical relationship
being described. For example, none of the values can be negative.
If d is greater than zero, then neither r nor t can be zero. In
these circumstances, none of the values are subjective, but they
are relative.
Whether or not it is possible to identify an absolute or intrin-
sic value in an object or a process, we are nonetheless able to
identify the specific relative weights of such values, given the ob-
jective end involved. An acorn is relatively more valuable to a
squirrel than to a protozoan. But an acorn has a value to the
squirrel once a given set of factual circumstances is known. If
survival is the objective, then the objective value of an acorn is
determined by the utility of the acorn relative to the squirrel's
121 See supra notes 43 and 52 and accompanying text.
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chances of survival. That value is descriptive of that set of factual
circumstances.1 22 Values can therefore be derived from facts, de-
spite Hume's is/ought distinction or the version of it known as
the fact/value disparity. There is, under these circumstances, a
fact/value relationship. There may be an is/ought distinction,
however, in determining which combination of values to select
from among those combinations that work.
To illustrate the distinction between "factor" and "value,"
consider the following: If I need to move a piano and a couch
through a doorway which measures three feet wide and six feet
tall, the two factors which control the size of the piano and couch
I can select are width and height. I can take anything through
that doorway which measures less than three feet by six feet in
some direction. The range of values which will work for my furni-
ture is limited by the physical reality of the doorway. If there are
other obstructions, such as sidewalls or a narrow entrance hall,
then a third and maybe a fourth physical factor enters into the
picture. The range of values for the length of my furniture is now
limited by the additional physics of the situation. The longer my
piece of furniture, the narrower it has to be to turn through the
doorway and still miss the walls. The value of the factor, length, is
now tied to the value of the factors, width and height. All of these
values may vary, but only within interrelated limits and a number
of absolute limits. I am free to select any set of values I wish pro-
vided they meet the minimum requirements established by physi-
cal reality. Shooting someone with a gun is an example of an
absolute limit.
With respect to survival, the factual base we have for analyzing
which rules work includes the history of life forms on Earth and
the results of scientific experiments. More than one set of rules
work. By comparing the rules which have worked and which have
not worked, we can determine what the factors are which affect
survival. In the previous section I referred to stability (S), produc-
tivity (P), and ingenuity (I) as the principal physical values or
factors related to survival. To clarify this, I need to say that S, P
and I are factors which remain constant. Values can be worked out
which fit these factors. I can vary these values only within the
limits of physical reality. Mathematically, I would say that physical
122 We routinely talk about generating mathematical and experimental values. These
are specific values which signify and describe a relationship between objects.
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survival, once given an operating environment, is a function of at
least three fattors: S, P, and I. There may be other factors. These
factors are variable placeholders in some matrix of factors that
determine whether an individual life form or a collection of life
forms survives over time.
The values for S, P, and I can vary within certain ranges and
only in certain ways with respect to each other and with respect to
the surrounding environment. The operating environment is a key
factor in determining which sets of S, P, and I will work. Consider
the rabbit's solution to its environmental circumstances. The rabbit
has few defenses (rule of technology). If it produced only a scat-
tering of offspring (rule of plenty), the rabbit as a species might
disappear.
The surrounding environment is itself a variable, although
one which is usually outside of the direct control of the species in-
volved." 3 The operating environment includes the behavior of
inanimate objects (like earthquakes) and the behavior of animated
objects (other life forms). We know that the set of workable solu-
tions for S, P and I is finite, because we have seen species come
and go. Consider the dinosaur. Rules which once worked no lon-
ger work. Other species may yet go as their environment changes.
For example, consider the whale. It's primary defenses are its
size and mobility. For awhile these were significant barriers to oth-
er life forms. Humans overcame these obstacles through advances
in technology. Human values for S, P and I were strengthened
relative to other species. The balance of power changed, and
whales, which do not reproduce like rabbits and do not have oth-
er defenses, found themselves ill-equipped to handle the new op-
erating environment. The set of whale values which plug into the
S, P and I formula no longer support survival if humans decide to
extinguish them.
Now consider human groups relative to other human groups.
Human groups 'have experimented throughout history with a vari-
ety of combinations of social, economic and technological rules,
changing their values for S, P, and I. Some of these combinations
have worked for a long time. Others at least for awhile. A third
group of combinations have failed. Sometimes, entire civilizations
have disappeared. Other times it was the group in charge which
123 In other words, S, P and I must vary as a group in response to the given envi-
ronment.
[Vol. 69:4
COMMENT-SURVIVAL VALUES AND OBJECTIVE MORALITY
disappeared (either physically or relative to remaining in power).
Sometimes the rules did not work even though the general operat-
ing environment around the group remained stable. The group
cratered internally. Other times, the rules ceased to work as the
surrounding environment changed. The Roman Empire was over-
run. Either way, where combinations of rules have not worked, the
rules have had to change. These changes have occurred either
through armed conflict or through a process of adaption and
accomodation.
Throughout this process of collective experimentation, individ-
ual humans and small coordinated groups of humans have contin-
ued to survive. Why? It appears on the face of history that despite
the flow of collective power and the adjustments in collective
rules, the defenses of individuals and small groups have not been
breached to the point of eliminating all individuals, and therefore
the species. The species survives through -individuals and small
groups of individuals. Individuals have continued to cooperate with
individuals to produce offspring, and resources have continued to
be available to reconstitute bodies and to constitute new ones.
Individuals possess the power to survive and the manner in which
they cooperate in small groups appears to be one of the major
factors in determining why the species continues to survive.
In this view, the stability of small groups (families, clans,
neighborhoods) would seem to have been a relatively more impor-
tant factor to species survival than the stability of large groups,
even though what large groups do is a major factor in determin-
ing the operating environment of small groups. It would seem
likely to remain that way unless some event occurs, traceable ei-
ther to a failure in the rules of some human group at some level
(e.g., rain forests or ozone depletion) or to the success of a rule
of survival in some other type of organism (e.g., AIDS virus),
which succeeds consequentially in piercing the defenses of all hu-
mans.
124
This does not depreciate the numerous occasions in history
where large and small groups have attempted to jeopardize or
eradicate the survival opportunities of other groups. To the con-
124 Only one clan or neighborhood has to survive a world wide calamity for the
species to survive and to regenerate. If we assume that approximately every twenty people
make a potential survival system, then we presently have more than 300 million different
such groups in existence.
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trary, those episodes offer proof of both the resiliency of human
groups to survive and the ineffectiveness, at least in modem histo-
ry, of subjective value systems based on physical conquest. In the
process, however, large number of individuals have experienced a
direct failure to survive. Operating still on the assumption that all
humans ought to survive and that almost all humans desire to
survive, these episodes reveal weaknesses in the S, P, and I values
adopted by humans collectively. Those weaknesses lead to failures
to survive, usually on both sides of a conflict.
Through the study of the history of life forms and the study
of science and applied science we have some idea, albeit incom-
plete, of which rules and values promote survival and which ones
disparage it, at both the large and small group levels. We have
some idea of which values for S, P and I are viable and which
ones are not. It seems safe enough to say, based on rational analy-
sis of the physical probabilities involved, that stealing, for example,
destabilizes a survival system and managing scarce resources sup-
ports rather than detracts from productivity. If so, then the latter
becomes a positive value or "virtue" in the system, while the former
becomes a negative value or "vice. 25 The values are relative, but
not subjective. Notions of moral worth do not seem to be needed
to make these determinations. The determinations are rational
and realistic. In the same vein, violent conquest is a weak use of
power, relative to the survival of the small groups who actually
carry the species forward into succeeding generations. Violent
conquest leads to failures to survive among the members of the
conquering group as well as members of the defending group.
To be viable, however, the survival system of a given group
has to take into account the objective consequences of the
decisionmaking processes of all other individuals and groups, in-
cluding the larger groups, such as cities and nations, to which the
given group belongs. There is no assurance that the perceived sur-
vival interests of my group coincide with the perceived survival
interests of other groups,121 or that one or more of these groups
125 See HUME, supra note 4. and text accompanying note 24. See supra Sentence 3b
and text accompanying note 99.
126 See supra Figure 7 at note 90 and accompanying text discussing six variable sys-
tem.
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have not modified actual values for subjective purposes which
disparage survival. The situation in the minds of all individuals in
all groups can be depicted as follows:
<X > <= influences
I I I
objectives1  objectivesp objectives,I I I
rules/values rules/valuesp rules/values.
SI I
(1) & (2) 1 (2b) & (3b) l (3a) I
I I I
events ==> meaning ==> [ action ] ==> events
Figure 11
This is a schematic of the system of objective and subjective
moralities I defined at the end of Part IV. The objectives, rules
and values with subscript '" are those which humans would follow
if humans did not have free will. They are probabilistic ought
statements, as in Sentences 1 and 2. Those with subscript "p" are
the physical objectives, rules and values we observe from studying
science and the history of life forms, as modified and projected
into the future by rational analysis. They are rational ought state-
ments, as in Sentences 2b and 3b. Those with subscript "s" are
subjective moral statements and values, as in Sentence 3a, and any
other subjective preferences the individual has. These may en-
hance or detract from survival. "Influences," as before, are exter-
nal and internal influences on how X makes decisions. They in-
clude our wants and desires and the persuasive efforts of others.
Gret's second point, that individual and group values will vary
and therefore there is no common value structure to support
species survival, is joined. There appear to be two situations: (i)
physical rules of survival for group interaction, and (ii) physical
rules of survival for actions within a group. The distinction ap-
pears to be one of identity and relative power. In the first case,
individuals in each group identify the individuals in the other
group as strangers or competitors. Physical conflict is a possibility.
Situation (i) can exist even if both groups are part of larger
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group, such as a city or nation. In situation (ii), the individuals
involved identify themselves as belonging to same group. The
group can still be large, such as a nation (relative to national
affairs), or small, such as a family. If peaceful resolution of any
differences is not achieved, the group may fragment into distinct
groups which then interact as under situation (i). Identity is lost.
Physical conflict can occur whether or not the group fragments.
Aggression is a physical rule encoded in the heads of most
mammals. What one does with it would appear to be both a ra-
tional and a moral issue.
Under either situation, the objective test remains the same:
groups which make decisions which support or at least do not
disparage survival will continue to survive unless taken out of the
system by another group. I suggest that the objective test, trans-
formed into a forward looking statement warning of consequenc-
es, 127 provides the basis for a common value structure which sup-
ports species survival, regardless of the type of groups involved,
and regardless of the values they have chosen for S, P and I. The
objective test can be rephrased as a two step rational ought state-
ment to guide individual group decisions:
(1) Avoid making moves which lead toward a failure to survive
(for both current and future generations).
(2) Make those moves which enhance the prospects of survival
for the participants in the group.
Such a rule rests on marginal analysis. Things happen at the
margin. Events have consequences, and those consequences have a
direction.12 The rule tells a group to move away from a failure
to survive and toward an enhancement in the prospects of its
survival, from whatever point the group is currently at within the
circle of human outcomes in Figure 9."m First get into the circle
which supports survival. Then move away from the edge to en-
hance the odds of continuing to survive. The rule, if followed for
all decisions would appear to maximize the odds of survival. The
objective test itself, however, does not require maximization. Hu-
mans may chose to skate along the edge. This becomes 'a question
127 See supra text accompanying note 21.
128 See supra text accompanying note 60.
129 See supra Part V.A.
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of risk assessment against the subjective objectives and values of
the individual. The rational ought statement is'not obligatory. It
merely warns of the consequences.'
With respect to situation (i), interacting groups, the two step
rule does not require that each of the interacting groups adopt
the same set of objective values for the factors which support
survival. Nor does it require that the groups hold comparable or
compatible moral values and other subjective preferences. It, does
require that each group adopt a set of objective values for the
factors S, P and I which are sufficient to withstand any hostile
advances from another group. It also requires each group which
desires to survive to eliminate any moral values or subjective pref-
erences which will lead the group toward a failure to survive. Any
other moral values and subjective preferences can be actualized
freely within the constraints of the objective test itself. The actual-
ization of such values and preferences become part of the work
the group does on the external world.1
3 '
That work is done on the external world is, like survival, an
objective end of the physical forces which produce life. Depending
on the theory involved, that work may be as valuable or more
valuable than surviving (either objectively or-subjectively depend-
ing on the basis of the theory). However, the objective con-
sequences relative to survival of that external work, whatever it is,
have to be taken into account by all those who desire to sur-
vive.1
32
At this stage of our survival analysis, the system would appear
to require a balance of power to remain stable. Any group which
cannot defend itself from a hostile advance is endangered, as the
whale is endangered. The question arises, therefore, whether step
2 of the rule requires groups, absent a balance of power, to at-
tempt to dominate "weaker" groups as a function of enhancing
their own odds of survival. The question is'a rational, one subject
130 The two step rule is utilitarian in that it measures decisions by the consequences
relative to an objective. The objective here, however, is neither pleasure nor dollars but
the continued existence of the group involved. Pleasure and dollars are separate values to
be weighed in the process of choosing between suggested survival solutions or deciding
to go against survival. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW
(4th ed. 1992); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990); Fish, supra
note 25.
131 See supra text accompanying note 48.
132 1 make no claims that an objective moral theory based on survival is the only
objective moral theory which can reasonably be advanced. My claim is that the processes
of physical survival have to be accounted for.
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to debate, as in Sentence 2b. I observe that the converse of the
question also arises: whether step 2 of the rule requires groups to
assist "weaker" groups as a function of enhancing their own odds
of survival. Which strategy, given the functioning of the physical
world, strengthens the odds of survival for the group making the
decision?
Several commonalities among humans suggests that the latter
is the rational approach under the current state of world affairs.
One commonality is the desire of each group to survive and to
see its succeeding generations survive. 33 A second commonality
is that humans are rational and conscious. A third commonality is
that "weaker" groups are not powerless. Individuals possess the
power to survive and to overcome obstacles, if they become aware
of that fact. The conclusion is that, unlike non-free willed organ-
isms, "weaker" groups will foresee the consequences of domination
and take steps as acts of free will to counteract "stronger" groups
by strengthening their defense capabilities or otherwise take ac-
tions to counterbalance their opponent's strength.
If rationality, consciousness and free will are enhancements to
the prospects of survival, then all groups which possess the power
to survive will continually endeavor to survive by establishing and
reestablishing the balance of power between interacting groups if
that is their best or only rational option. If so, a strategy of domi-
nation would potentially achieve nothing more than a pattern of
continual world conflict, leading to failures to survive on both
sides of most or all physical conflicts. Physical conflict invites retal-
iation. Rational analysis, on the other hand, identifies the common
factors required for mutual survival. If this is the case, the desire to
survive provides the common value, and -the power to survive-
combined with rational analysis-provides the common means, for
an objective morality to function between culturally diverse groups.
I suggest that this process leads necessarily to a mutual recog-
nition of physical, although not philosophical or ideological, neu-
trality with respect to the subjective moral values and preferences
of the different communities or groups, except as to those points
which threaten mutual survival. If so, then the physical rules of
survival support behavior which leads to non-violent coexistence.
133 If the group does not desire its succeeding generations to survive, then under the
objective test the group will be on a survival course only if the consequences of their
desire for prolongation lead to long-term survival for the group without requiring consid-
eration of the survival interests of successive generations. This may have generally been
the case in the past. It is not apparent that it will remain that way.
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Whether or not such a process actually takes place, or will tend to-
wards taking place, depends on whether the subroutines of X,
including free will, are a long term enhancement to our prospects
of survival and on whether it is more rational to lend assistance
than to attempt conquest in light of the current world situa-
tion.1
3 4
With respect to situation (ii), actions between the individuals
of given group, the problem is to avoid the group fragmenting
into smaller groups in a manner that causes physical conflicts
leading to failures to survive. Whether the group remains intact is
a function of the values the group has selected for S, P and I and
a function of the operating environment. The selected values must
be sufficiently flexible to accomodate changes in the operating
environment of the group. The operating environment is a func-
tion of the objective and subjective values adopted by each individ-
ual in the group, as in Figure 11.
In direct relation to this is the question of multiple solutions.
Rationality, in service to the group's survival, will-suggest more
than one, viable solution to a given problem. A mechanism is
therefore needed for selecting from among multiple solutions. An
objective morality based on survival does not require this
decisionmaking mechanism to be neutral with respect to individual
or sub-group preferences. It requires it to be stable. The group
may have been organized to pursue subjective ends. Under the
objective test, if the specific rules and values of the group do not
work, then the rules must change or the group will not remain
intact.
If the group is large and diverse, such a nation, the situation
may become like situation (i), depending on the ability of sub-
groups to influence the power structure. A decisionmaking process
which remains neutral to individual preferences which do not
disparage survival would provide a common basis for accomodating
adjustments to the values and rules assigned to S, P and I. The
existing power structure, however, may not be neutral with respect
134 Clearly the human world is not finished with ideological and cultural conflict. If
the development of ideas is on balance an enhancement to long-term survival of the hu-
man species, then such conflict is not likely to come to an end. The question is wheth-
er groups will gradually develop non-combative techniques for developing, actualizing and
exchanging ideas. In the same fashion that the exchange of genes strengthens the gene
pool, I suggest that the non-combative exchange of ideas increases the odds of human
survival. See generally JAMES D. HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERI-
CA (1991).
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to the subjective preferences and values of its members. Nor can it
be neutral with respect to any preferences and values which do
not support physical survival. Realistically, conflicts in values are
likely to occur. The forces behind these conflicts will play them-
selves out in the history of the particular group, through a po-
tential mixture of physical conflict and rational accomodation.
These forces are generated inside our heads. They appear to stem
directly from our wants and desires.
We need more analysis on the source and role of wants and
desires. Action appears to be triggered by desires. Wants and de-
sires appear to be a principal source of actualizing power within
the human brain. What regulates our assortment of desires? If
ideas are physical, then what impact do ideas have on establishing
new wants and desires? What role does rationality and moral evalu-
ation play in monitoring incoming ideas? If individual freedom,
for example, is a long-term advantage to the survival of the hu-
man species, then is hearing of freedom sufficient to "awaken" a
motivating desire in the mind? Are ideas physical? We need more
facts and more history to answer these questions.
Physical conflicts may be necessary for sub-groups to establish
a stable basis for survival of their sub-groups within a larger group.
Such conflicts will lead to failures to survive. The burden would
appear to shift to the group in power to recognize the survival
interests of its sub-groups. If it does not, and if sub-groups become
aware of their power to survive where their short-term or long-
term survival options are being denied, then conflicts would ap-
pear to be likely. If the group destabilizes, the values assigned to
S, P and I will have to change.
I suggest that a theory of equitable distribution of benefits
and burdens, balanced against the need for group survival, may be
a logical consequence of an objective morality based on physical
survival, at least in an environment of cultural diversity where sub-
groups are not powerless.135 Any other theory would seem to en-
tail a preference for the subjective values of one individual or sub-
group over another, leading perhaps to unresolvable conflicts or
the requirement to maintain control by force.
History has shown, however, that systems based on force,
which limit the options of particular sub-groups, can remain stable
for long periods of time. This raises the question of whether force
or consent provides the more effective basis for long-term survival
135 See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 4.
[Vol. 69:4
COMMENT-SURVIVAL VALUES AND OBJECTIVE MORALITY
of larger groups such as nations, which are made up of smaller
groups, such as families. I suggest that to answer that question
requires an analysis of the factors of productivity and ingenuity, as
well as stability. The use of force appears to decrease productivity
(related to resources needed for survival) and to thwart ingenuity.
If so, a system based on consent may have long-term survival ad-
vantages over a system based on force.
I further suggest that step 2 of the general rule provides a
basis for supporting non-violent competition between individuals
and groups (in ideas, economics or otherwise). Competition ap-
pears to be a physical rule of survival which serves to identify
survival practices which are most efficient. A non-violent compo-
nent avoids unnecessary failures to survive which might otherwise
occur but retains the advantage. Competition encourages innova-
tion. The combination of non-violent competition, equitable distri-.
bution of benefits and burdens, and stability based on consent
appears to be a rational solution to the factors S, P and I. Wheth-
er individual nations will inevitably move in this direction depends,
however, on the decisions free willed humans make and on the
actual content of the physical rules of 'survival. We need more
facts, more history, and more analysis on how the subroutines of
X work.
V. CONCLUSION
A. Is, Human Survival Justified?
The preceding pages of this essay have been based on the
proposition that if humans want to survive, then they ought to
adopt an objective morality based on physical survival. Generally,
humans do desire to survive, so as to such humans the condition
is met.' Philosophically, however, we are left with the question
of whether humans ought to survive, for practical reasons or oth-
envise, as in Sentence 2b. Or, more broadly, can it be said that
the humans species ought to survive?
The approach I've taken in the essay is to focus on small
group survival. I've done so on the theory that if any given small
group ought to survive, then the species ought to survive. Small
group survival does not necessarily equate to individual survival.
Survival, within in the context of the physical forces which pro-
136 See HART, supra note 1, at 188.
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duce life, incorporates a requirement for propagation of future
generations of surviving groups. Self-interested survival is therefore
a misnomer or contradiction in physical terms. The connotation
that "survival" applies to individuals of groups and not to groups is
physically misleading. The desire to prolong one's personal exis-
tence does not equate to survival in the physical sense. It equates
only to individual prolongation. The desire to personally survive
does not equate to a desire for the species to survive and may, in
fact, work against species survival.1
37
This does not mean that each individual must want to phys-
ically participate in bearing offspring. It means instead that to
participate in the physical process of survival, an individual imust
identify with some group and support that group's survival. The
focus of survival is not short-term alone, but necessarily includes
some vision of the status of the next generation and the genera-
tion after that. It is, in other words, an insufficient condition that
most humans do desire to survive, unless it is meant that most
humans desire to see future generations of their group survive.
B. A Physical Answer
My first argument treats survival as a physical question: As a
physical question, if survival is based on or is the consequence of a
set of forces, like gravity, which is intrinsic to the physical world,
then survival needs no more and no less justification than does
gravity. That question resolves itself into a search for a justification
for the underlying energy of the physical world and the nature of
the fabric of empty space.' Searching for realistic explanations
for energy and how energy behaves seems reasonable. Searching
for a justification for energy seems unreasonable. The physical
processes we see, investigate and rely on, trace back to the nature
and character of energy. Energy appears to be selfjustifying. Until
it can be shown that energy is contingent, then it seems reason-
able to conclude that energy simply is. Humans are an expression
of the energy which constitutes known reality. It is from the be-
havior of energy that rational oughts can be derived. Adoption of
137 See DULBECCO, supra note 15, at 167-217 (the development of a heterosexual re-
quirement for DNA recombination and propagation potentially pits individual interests
against the species).
138 See supra Parts III.A & B and the questions at the ends of those two sections: (1)
What sort of thing is energy, and what is it's source? (2) What sort of relationship exists
between energy and life?
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the statement that "humans ought to survive" becomes self-justify-
ing, as merely a recognition of the existing state of affairs and the
selfjustifying basis of energy."9
Under this physical scheme, it is the decision not to survive
which requires justification. This is so because to not survive re-
quires contradicting or intervening in the forces which have pro-
duced life. Accepting the forces which produced life requires only
accepting nature, which appears to exist, i.e., is not an illusion.
We rely on the scientific processes of nature on a daily basis. To
deny something which does not appear to be illusory would seem
irrational and require explanation. One would have to deny one-
self in the process. Conversely, to affirm the processes of energy is
to affirm oneself. Whatever else we may be subjectively-we are all
materializations of the same kind of energy.
If the decision not to survive is physical, then it is explainable
in terms of 'a miswiring in the brain. If it is an act of free will,
then free will has chosen to act against the history of energy. It
seems reasonable to ask for more than an explanation. It seems
reasonable to ask for a justification for that decision and reason-
able to accept energy as selfjustifying.
C. Other Arguments
If the adoption of the statement that "humans ought to sur-
vive" is not self-justifying, then can other rational arguments be
made? As a realist, I believe I can infer several propositions from
my examination of the rules of physical conduct and several tenta-
tive conclusions based on those propositions:
First, individual humans are confronted with a peculiar form
of a categorical imperative. Namely, individual humans must de-
cide whether they are going to continue to survive. They are pre-
sented with the question by the pressure of physical events. They
are confronted with an imperative to make a decision on a contin-
ual basis, because they are continually free to reverse their existing
decision. The imperative is peculiar in that it obligates a human
to give an answer, but it does not obligate a human to give an
affirmative answer.
139 This is not to say that metaphysical explanations for energy should not be ex-
plored. Metaphysical explorations become part of the work done on the external world.
Work done on the external world is one of the objective ends of the forces which pro-
duce life. See supra text accompanying note 48.
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I observe that the existence of the imperative is not contingent
on subjective choice or subjective action. The existence of the im-
perative does not rest on how humans subjectively evaluate surviv-
ing. Yet it demands a value judgment by each free willed human
at the moment each human recognizes there is a choice. I suggest
therefore that the existence of an imperative that necessarily
demands an value judgment necessarily points to a value.4
Furthermore, the value must be absolute and not relative
because the value is not measured by what survival does for some
other process. All other ends, whether objective or subjective,
could be found to be valueless, yet the physical processes of surviv-
al, which are an expression of energy, will nevertheless continue
to exist as an intrinsic rule of energy itself, like gravity. This in-
trinsic rule will continue to demand an evaluation by any free
willed organism that recognizes there is an option. Since the value
of surviving is not relative, the value cannot yield to physical mea-
surement. Humans have no way of measuring an absolute. All free
will can do is recognize that the value is immeasurable or deny
the existence of the value. Neither a denial nor an affirmation
changes what the objective value is. This does not rationally estab-
lish that humans ought to survive, however, unless it can be ar-
gued that humans ought to affirm an immeasurable value by en-
deavoring to actualize that value. That the value cannot be mea-
sured would appear, however, to establish a basis for rationally
declaring that all humans have an equal intrinsic value. Humans
may measure each other on a relative basis, but each free willed
individual is asked the same question and has the ability to give
an answer.
Second, unless humans survive, no subjective end, except not
surviving, can be achieved. Under this argument, personal survival
must necessarily have a subjective value (to that free willed subject)
equal to no less than whatever value that person assigns by free will
to the alternate subjective end, whether or not the free willed
subject recognizes an objective value in surviving. The value of an
alternate subjective end is measured by a free willed subject's will-
ingness to give up life itself.4 ' If a free willed subject chooses to
sacrifice his or her life for that alternate end, then the conclusion
140 See supra Figure 7 and text accompanying note 90 describing the six variables in-
volved in values.
141 See supra Figure 11 and text accompanying note 126. My suggestion is that a free
willed person cannot hold a subjective value, (relative to an alternate end) which is high-
er than the greater of value, or valuep (relative to personal survival).
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is not that life is worth less than the alternate end, but that the
value of the alternate end, to that subject, and therefore the value
of life to that subject, is either immeasurable or is worth noth-
ing 142i . m
Third, whether or not individuals make a conscious decision
about survival, their actions speak for them. Almost every human
decides daily to affirm de facto the physical process of survival by
getting up and going to work and by participating in a system
which includes the propagation of the species. There is a problem
with this. If surviving is not elevated to a conscious objective, and
thought through rationally, then humans who intend to support
survival may take actions which set into motion a stream of con-
sequences which lead to an unwitting failure ,to survive. While it
may not have been the case in the past, it appears to be the case
now that for humans to survive they must consciously decide to
survive and act rationally to avoid not surviving.' This argument
is pragmatic in that it begins With the assumption that humans will
endeavor to survive and moves forward from there. The inductive
inference, which is postulated as a possibility, is that humans
ought to survive. This inference can be acted on until falsified.'
It has several billion years of history behind it.
Finally, the status of the surrounding environment with re-
spect to the physical survival of future generations depends on
what the present generation does. If there is a reason for the
present generation to survive, whether we perceive it correctly or
not, then presumably that reason will still exist for the next gener-
ation.4  The next generation is dependent on the current one,
however, for the opportunity to experience or discover that rea-
son.
142 Consider Regina v. Dudley, 14 Q.B. 273 (1884). I suggest that the drawing of lots
among consenting participants in a situation where survival itself is on the line is the
only course which supports stability of the human group. If no one in the group is will-
ing to sacrifice their own life, then physical power will determine the outcome, as it
generally does among non-free willed organisms. The force generated internally by the
desire to personally survive is considerable. Such a force supports survival. Such a force
actualized as raw physical power, however, supports short-term survival at the risk of long-
term survival, at least where retaliation is possible. Where retaliation is possible, raw phys-
ical power is a weaker use of force than consent, which supports both short-term and
long-term survival.
143 See supra Part II.A. (Thought Experiments #1 and #3).
144 See generally Lakatos, supra note 2. -
145 See supra text following note 27.
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I suggest this fourth inference from existing facts provides the
necessary is/ought relationship to justify human survival, although
it is contingent. If life has a present justifying value for a living
organism or will have such a value at some point in the future,
whether or not perceived, then physical survival becomes necessary
in order to discover what that value is and to preserve that oppor-
tunity of discovery for a future generation.
D. A Closing Thought Experiment
Experiment #5. Imagine you are living twenty, thirty or forty
years in the future. You've been successful and hate to think that
your life will end one day. Bio-scientists have yet to figure out how
to eliminate the aging process, but breakthroughs are occurring
every day. The geneticists have already figured out how to replace
the DNA of one cell with the DNA from another cell. A variety of
cloning procedures are now available.'46 You know a doctor who
is willing to substitute all the chromosomes from one of your cells
for all the chromosomes of two different embryos in two different
consenting surrogate mothers immediately after artificial insemi-
nation. These embryos will not be traditional offspring in the
sense of combining half your chromosomes with half the chromo-
somes of your mate, but instead will be genetic replicates of you
at the time of the cloning procedure.
What is life?
How does new technology fit into our survival processes? To
what ends should new technology be directed, and how are advan-
tages and risks to be measured?
C. Emerson Talmage
146 The cloning concept described in this thought experiment does not (yet) exist.
Cloning of selected genes in limited situations for medical uses does exist. See generally
DULBECCO, supra note 15, at 127, 13046 (discussing cloning); ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS
ON HUMAN HEALTH. 23 (Sidney Draggan et al. eds., 1987) (part of a report of experts
submitted to the Council on Environmental Quality Inter-agency Subcabinet Committee on
Long-Term Environmental Research). Experts in the field are debating the advantages,
risks and ethics of genetic engineering procedures.
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